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


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ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION



ARTHUR M. LEWIS







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VITAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

BY
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I.

THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY.

That which distinguishes the last century from all preceding centuries more than anything else is the amazing development of positive science. The only thing that at all compares with it is the growth of machine industry.

This great growth of science has led Lester F. Ward to compare it to a prairie fire, "such as used to sweep across the mainly treeless, grassy plains of northern Iowa."

"Such a fire," says Ward, "with a front of ten to twenty miles would advance at a rate of five to ten miles an hour, consuming everything in its way. But the line of flame, which could be distinctly traced, especially in the night, to a great distance by the eye, was never straight, but in consequence of certain checks at one point and specially favorable conditions at another, it would present great irregularities. Long tongues of fire would be seen projecting far in advance of the main line, leaving narrow, unburned tracts between

them, and every other conceivable form of indentation and irregularity would mark the boundary of the advancing conflagration. Occasionally sparks, carried far in advance by the high wind which the fire alone was capable of generating, would ignite the grass some distance from the point from which it emanated, and temporary islands would be created. But if any one spot be watched, all these separate projections would be seen soon to join, and the wider sinuses to be swept along until the whole area in question was completely consumed, and the scene of operations transferred to a point far in advance where the same process was being repeated, and so on indefinitely. The whole country behind these rapidly advancing scenes would be black, the devouring flames not being prevented by any of their erratic performances from ultimately compassing their designs. * * * The progress of discovery, of science, and of knowledge and truth in the world generally, follows this same method, whatever department we may examine."

In applying this fine metaphor we are at once struck by its illustration of the "irregularity" of the advance of science. One part of the field of knowledge seems to have offered comparatively little resistance. This is the

region occupied by astronomy and physics. Here the advance has been made earlier and more rapidly than in other fields. Newton began a general illumination of it with his theory of gravitation, and Kant thrust out a great tongue of fire with his nebular hypothesis. Then the conflagration attacked another great expanse—biology. Here Lamarck, Darwin, Haeckel and a host of other illustrious men applied the torch and fed the flames which have revolutionized all our thinking. But there was one great tract which refused to burn, while the fires of truth blazed on either side and behind it. Here an impenetrable darkness prevailed. This tract we now call sociology—the field which embraces the phenomena of society.

There are two reasons why this area refused to burn. First, the complexity of the material making it almost incombustible; second, a large army of persons doing everything possible to prevent its being ignited. These interesting persons were quite willing that the fires should burn everywhere else and would even help their spread, but this one sacred area must be kept immune.

If any daring individual threw a burning faggot into this guarded domain some of these official protectors would rush to stamp it out,

while others would devote their attention to the offender.

To break through this Chinese wall men of exceptional capacity were required, and many, even of the strongest, were thwarted and ruined in their attempts.

But in the middle of the last century two men appeared who were, both by nature and training, pre-eminently fitted to invade this territory. Brow-beaten and buffeted as they were by the intellectual hirelings of an interested ruling class, by sheer strength of brain and tenacity of purpose they held their ground.

They lit a great flaming torch, and, in spite of all that could be done to hinder, they threw it far out and it fell in the very center of this area, consecrated to the ruling class; there it started an island of fire which refused to be extinguished, but grew and spread in all directions until today it illumines every path and by-way of human activity, and constitutes the foundation and superstructure both, of a true science of society. That torch is known as "the materialistic conception of history," and the two men were Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.

History has for its theme the life of man in society, and this, of course, includes the development of society itself. Thus a proper

understanding of history is the first necessity of sociology. The first and most important task of the sociologist is, therefore, to discover the fundamental law of social development.

Many unsuccessful attempts have been made to solve this problem of historical causation. The weakest of these is the one which proclaims religion as the keynote of progress.

All Socialist writers and many others agree that religion must be regarded as an effect of social movement rather than a cause. In "The Holy Family," Marx says of those who think the opposite: "Just as they separate the soul from the body, and themselves from the world, so they separate history from natural science and industry, so they find the birthplace of history not in the gross material production on earth, but in the misty cloud formation of heaven." And in his "Critique of Political Economy" he says: "It is very easy to discover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of religion."

If Marx and Engels, when speaking of the mode of production, etc., being the foundation of the political, juridical and intellectual superstructure of society, do not specifically name religion, it is not because it is not included, nor yet because they are afraid of the prejudices of the superstitious, but because they had

so thoroughly absorbed the results of modern scientific research that they considered it of too little importance to be entitled to special mention. The omission is rather unfortunate, as it has been taken advantage of to argue that the Socialist philosophy has nothing to do with religion.

"The religious interpretation of history," says Professor Seligman, "even in the modified form of Mr. Benjamin Kidd's theory, has found but few adherents."

Another and more plausible attempt is that "great man" theory which reaches its summit in Carlyle's "Heroes and Hero-Worship." But Spencer and others have found it quite easy to show that great men are the creatures and not the creators of their age.

A third attempt may be called the political interpretation of history. This theory, which has its roots in Aristotle, claims that history reveals a constant development from monarchy to democracy; a steady trend from absolutism to freedom. One quite often hears a Socialist speaker calmly put this forward, under the pleasant delusion that he is teaching Socialism.

With such a one, history begins with King John and democracy gets its starting point at Runnymede. If he would take the pains to read Morgan's "Ancient Society" or Engels'

"Origin of the Family," he would find that the whole science of anthropology is against him. For nearly a hundred thousand years before kings were known the human race lived in primitive communism, a society that came vastly nearer to democracy than anything civilization has to show.

Now we come to a writer who discarded metaphysics and theology and tried to put this problem on a solid, material foundation. This was the justly celebrated author of the "History of Civilization in England," Buckle. In his famous second chapter, entitled, "The Influence of Physical Laws," he endeavors to show that the character of a society depends on the kind of a country it is placed in. Climate, soil, water supply, mineral deposits, etc., were the determining factors. He even attempted to show that low wages were due to a hot climate, while a cold climate raises them. His argument is that, carbonaceous foods, which are necessary in a cold climate, are dearer than nitrogenous foods, which are sufficient in warmer countries.

Where Buckle's theory breaks down is, that while it might account for the condition of a society, it can not explain the "movement" of a society. It is obvious that if the character of a society depends on the climate and other

physical elements of its external environment, then so long as this external environment remains constant society can not change. But the revolution of 1789, which transformed French society, was neither preceded nor followed by any material change in the climate or soil of France. It is absurd to suppose that a moving effect can be due to a stationary cause.

This difficulty has also destroyed the view that the basic factor of history is human nature. During the last thousand years the changes, if any, in human nature have been so slight as to be imperceptible, while society has undergone drastic changes.

It must be conceded, however, that while Buckle's theory proved inadequate, it certainly moved in the right direction. It did at least try to find a solution of the problem of history in real things instead of theological ghosts or metaphysical phantasms. Again the factors named by him do play an important role in social construction, and the element of truth in his theory is included in that Materialistic Conception of History, discovered by Marx, which stands at the center of the Socialist philosophy.

What, then, was that vital factor which Buckle completely missed, but which Marx had already discovered more than ten years before?

It was this: that the change which precedes and causes all changes in the superstructure of society is a change in the foundation of society—the mode by which a society produces and distributes its wealth. The main factor, then, according to Marx, is the economic factor.

This prominence of the economic factor has led some writers to change the name of the theory to the “Economic Interpretation of History,” among others, Thorold Rogers, of England, and Professor Seligman, of America. Again, French and Italian Socialist writers prefer “Economic Determinism.” The controversy about the name results partly from the difficulty of expressing new ideas in old words—putting new wine in old bottles—and partly from misunderstandings as to the scope of the theory itself.

“Materialistic” is objected to because it tends to link the Socialist philosophy with scientific materialism. There are several schools of materialism and toward most of these the Socialist attitude is critical, but it must be conceded that Socialism carried to anything like a logical conclusion is thoroughly materialistic. But, says the uninitiated critic, do not Socialists have ideals and are they not to that extent idealists? This is what comes of men using words they do not understand. The question

as to whether a man is an idealist or a materialist is no more determined by his having ideals than it would be by his having red hair or a lame foot. It is a case of confusing two words that look alike, but have entirely different meanings. In philosophy the materialist is one who believes that matter is antecedent and superior to the idea, while the idealist believes the opposite; that matter is subsequent and subordinate to the idea. The "ideals" that either or both may have is entirely foreign to the question and the man who confuses them thereby reveals his complete ignorance of the question.

"Economic Determinism" is criticized on the ground that it associates Socialism with the general theory of determinism. But modern science is based on belief in the universality of causation and it is difficult to see how one is going to escape the conclusion that all effects are determined by their causes.

"Economic" is objected to because it describes only the main factor and not all the factors. This objection has at least this foundation; that the word economic has been used to introduce limitations of the theory that would have astonished Marx. Christian Socialists use it to deny that Socialism has anything to do with religion, and the Anarchists in the

I. W. W. used it in the same way to deny that Socialism had anything to do with politics, and the one position is as reasonable as the other. The main difficulty is that "economic" does not properly include climate, soil, coal and ore deposits, and other forms of natural wealth emphasized by Buckle and carefully included by Marx.

Both Lafargue and Ferri prefer the term "Economic Determinism," but while Lafargue, in his controversy with Jaures, argued that economic development is the sole determinant of progress, Ferri takes the opposite view. He says: "For my part, ever since I have demonstrated the perfect accord between the Marxian and Darwinian theories I have said: Very well, the economic conditions of a nation explain its political, moral, intellectual conditions, but the economic condition is in its turn the result of other factors. For instance, how can the industrialism of England in the nineteenth century be explained? Take away the coal mines and you could not have the economic conditions of England as they are."

It should be remembered, however, that while it is very desirable to use the best name, it is much more important to have a clear knowledge of the theory. We will now apply this theory to a few of the leading facts of

history and observe its merits as a principle of historical interpretation.

One of the great events of history which, until recently, was shrouded in impenetrable mystery, is the invasion and the overthrow of the Roman Empire by the barbarians. Why these unprovoked visitors, all unheralded, swooped down on Europe, and completely transformed it, was a problem that baffled the most acute historians. But presently came Peter Kropotkin with an explanation that has the merit of being highly probable and supported by certain facts.

Kropotkin says: "Men of science have not yet settled upon the causes which, some two thousand years ago, drove whole nations from Asia into Europe, and resulted in the great migration of barbarians which put an end to the West Roman Empire. One cause, however, is naturally suggested to the geographer as he contemplates the ruins of populous cities in the deserts of Central Asia, or follows the old beds of rivers now disappeared and the wide outlines of lake now reduced to the size of mere ponds. It is dessication (drying up): a quite recent dessication, continued at a speed which we formerly were not prepared to admit. Against it man was powerless. When the inhabitants of Northwest Mongolia and East

Turkestan saw that water was abandoning them, they had no course open to them but to move down the broad valleys leading to the lowlands, and to thrust westward the inhabitants of the plains."

And so these strange and unexpected invaders, who had been regarded by many as the instruments of divine vengeance to repay the Romans for their sins, were moved by that very material consideration—a failing water supply.

The crusades present a fine example of the play of material forces and considerations, where only lofty and spiritual motives were supposed to prevail.

Travelers from Syria spread stories of the great riches of the Saracens among the loafing European, mercenary soldiery, which found time heavy on its hands. They soon discovered that more wealth could be gathered by visiting the holy land than by selling their fighting power to petty and often impoverished princes. "According to one intelligent historian," says Loria, "they were inspired solely by cupidity and the desire of booty." At the time of the fourth crusade the business nature of the transaction was so thoroughly recognized that the Venetian shipping merchants would only carry the warriors of the faith on

their vessels on contract of one-half of the plunder when they returned.

It appears that the crusade business reached such immense proportions that the Republic of Venice entered into it by loaning sums of money on terms similar to the ship owners, for Loria says:

"As some of the crusaders were unable to pay the sums they owed the Republic of Venice, the Doge, Henry Dandolo, proposed that they should acquit themselves of their obligation by undertaking a crusade against the enemies of St. Marc, and particularly against Zara. No more brutal evidence of the economic basis of the movement and its purely commercial and capitalistic ends could be furnished than this crusade against a Christian town; for clearly the religious motive had no place in any such enterprise."

Again Loria says: "The preachers of the sixth crusade themselves entered into the victorious circle of speculation, and paid far more attention to gathering in the funds than to assembling the men-at-arms, even going so far as to grant the same absolution to those who disbursed a fixed sum as to those who personally enrolled."

After citing a number of other equally significant facts Loria concludes: "These facts

taken together ought to be enough to persuade even the most determined illusionist that history really turns upon economic facts, whose influence the brilliant effulgence of faith succeeds but imperfectly in concealing."

The discovery of America by Christopher Columbus is usually presented to the schoolboy as a wonderful romance, so much so that he confuses it in his mind with the marvelous exploits of Romulus and Remus, and King Arthur of the round table. But the economic foundations of that event are quite conspicuous if the history of that epoch is investigated.

For a hundred years prior to that memorable voyage, Europe carried on a profitable commerce with India. In the twelfth century there were many available routes to Hindustan. Along these routes great ports such as Trebizond on the Black Sea, Licia in the Levant, and Alexandria near the Red Sea, grew and prospered. Toward the close of that century these routes were closed one by one by hordes of savages, making trade impossible. The only one that remained open was by way of Egypt, and this being at the mercy of the Moors and Turks, they promptly took advantage of their position to exact immense revenues from the Eastern trade. Then, in order to strengthen themselves still further, they

used part of this income to build up a military system that menaced all Europe.

Europe's only hope of salvation lay in the discovery of a new trade route to India. The merchants of Genoa, Venice and Spain were in the clutches of economic necessity; their trade in those spices and silks, which were in great demand among the members of the European nobility, was in danger of extinction. It was for this reason that Isabella and Ferdinand encouraged the ambitious dreams of Columbus. This was the economic pressure that sent the great navigator across an unexplored ocean.

The same necessity sent Vasca da Gama down the west coast of Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope, and into the Indian Ocean, to that Mecca of mediæval traders—India.

The English barons compelled King John to set a limit to his encroachments on their incomes at Runnymede, and if the first Charles could have persuaded the English bourgeoisie that there would be some end to his royal levies and taxes he could have saved his head.

Problems of history that have caused volumes of controversial literature become exceedingly simple when touched by the Marxian theory of historical interpretation. Thus we discover that the Lutheran reformation was

simply the idealogical expression of the economic struggle between the Papal Court and the German ruling class as to who should reap the fruits of the German laborer's toil.

This luminous theory explains not only prominent historical events but also the entire sweep of human progress. Savagery, barbarism, civilization, tribal communism, chattel slavery, serfdom, capitalism, all yield up their secrets when this open sesame is applied to them.

As social evolution proceed the pace accelerates and Tennyson's couplet is justified: "Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay."

From the inauguration of private property, each new social order contains its own ruling class. But as that order flourishes it generates within its own womb the class destined to cause its overthrow. And thus, in spite of itself, it digs its own grave.

To this great law of class struggles, capitalism is no exception. By its own mode of wealth production and distribution it has developed that class of wage laborers whose historic role is the creation of a new society.

Arthur W. Pinero, second only among British dramatists to our own Bernard Shaw, in "The Notorious Mrs. Ebbsmith," presents a

scene in which Agnes (Mrs. Ebbsmith) is twitted by an aristocratic debauchee about the working class, with whom she identifies herself. In her fierce reply she describes that class as follows:

“The sufferers, the toilers, that great crowd of old and young stamped by excessive labor and privation all of one pattern—whose backs bend under burdens, whose bones ache and grow awry; whose skins, in youth and age, are wrinkled and yellow. Those from whom a fair share of the earth’s space and of the light of day is withheld. The half-starved who are bidden to stand with their feet in the kennel to watch gay processions in which you and your kind are borne high. Those who would strip the robes from a dummy aristocracy and cast the broken dolls into the limbo of a nation’s discarded toys. Those who—mark me—are already on the highway, marching, marching; whose time is coming as surely as yours is going!”

II.

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION.

"To test our scattered opinions and beliefs by bringing them together," says Professor David G. Ritchie, "is the main function of a sound philosophy."

The mind has much in common with a camera. It receives impressions of the outside world, and, by a process of its own, converts them into ideas. If history seems to be a conglomerate mass of jumbled contradictions, it is because the records have presented to the mind photographic pictures of different periods from which it has derived ideas which were true only of the pictures and the periods to which they belonged. It was looking at things as static or, so to speak, stationary, that made the universe and most of its parts incomprehensible. The discovery and application of the theory of evolution has solved the riddle. In the light of that theory we are able to think of things in their motion; we can, even from the conflicting and imperfect annals themselves, reconstruct the particular period

and reproduce the moving panorama of social evolution.

To the man who has not mentally assimilated the evolutionary viewpoint, history is as unintelligible as it was to the philosophers of the eighteenth century. Those who have adopted its phrases without the mental assimilations of its principles are in about the same case. Then there are those peculiarly constructed brains which are able to accept evolution in one field and reject it completely in others. There are quite a number of people who have no objection to evolution in "economics" who would apparently prefer a revival of the black plague to having it applied anywhere else.

Karl Marx accepted evolution with all its consequences and implications, and applied it without any reservations to those questions which engaged his attention. It is because he did this successfully that he is justly regarded as the real creator of sociology and the founder of that historical philosophy which has its roots in evolutionary materialism.

The Marxian philosophy is all of a piece, and in its main principles it stands or falls as a whole. His revolutionary conclusions follow logically from his premises. To reject the idea of a social revolution and expect the doc-

trine of the class struggle to remain unaffected, is as though one should take the fifth story out of a ten-story building and expect the upper five stories to remain suspended in the air. If the disappearance of capitalism does not imply a social revolution, the works of Karl Marx may as well be laid away with those medieval bibles in which it is pictorially shown that the revolution of the earth is due to the labors of two lusty angels, one at either pole turning a crank.

In the preface to his "Critique of Political Economy" Marx defines a social revolution as change in the superstructure of society resulting from a change in its economic base. He says: "With the change of the economic basis the whole vast superstructure becomes slowly or rapidly revolutionized." In previous lectures we have seen that the method by which a society makes its living—produces and distributes its wealth—is the chief determinant of its social and intellectual life. As Marx puts it—we must seek in political economy the anatomy of civil society.

If this definition is accepted we are far upon the way to understand the difference between revolution and some of the social disturbances which have been confounded with revolution. The mere resort to force is not

necessarily revolutionary, for every political measure and every decree of law has behind it the force of the state and will be enforced by the policeman's club or at the point of the bayonet, if the ruling class deems it necessary. The only real and final test as to whether such a law or measure is constitutional is whether it serves or menaces the fundamental interest of the ruling class. Nothing could be more amusing than the widely disseminated notion that decisions of the Supreme Court are guided by some musty document called the constitution, written a long time ago. Why should that august body exercise itself unnecessarily about the meaning of a declaration of principles written by men who had no possible means of anticipating all the exigencies and contingencies of the present day, when there is always standing open before them that divine, infallible revelation entitled "The Interests of Capital." By a law that rings true as gravitation itself, an injunction against a labor union is pre-eminently constitutional, while a boycott by such a union against the scab Buck Stove Company, or the scab Methodist Book Concern, is by the same rule a menace to society.

According to the Socialistic theory, the political and juridical superstructure of a so-

ciety must be in harmony with its economic foundations. This is another way of saying the class that controls production will control law and politics. This is precisely why the state exists; it appeared with private property in the means of life, and its historic mission is to defend that institution against the rebellious or revolutionary uprisings of the dispossessed. If a class that controls in the economic world does not control the political state, it must either do so at once by the revolutionary overthrow of the class that does rule in politics, or the class that rules in politics will use that power to become dominant in economics. Sociology has no more certain truth than that two forms of power go together.

The American civil war between North and South on the slavery question is a fine illustration of this. Here, economically speaking, were two wholly different forms of society. They had different modes of production—chattel slavery and wage labor. The anomaly lay in their having one joint government. The northern wage system was the most vital, modern and expansive, and consequently the northern capitalist was the dominant factor in the national government. But the slave owner of the South needed the government in

his business quite as much as the northern capitalist. And that need amounted to a positive necessity.

There were three possible alternatives: (1) The slave owner might get control of the government and make his control secure by extending chattel slavery into the North; (2) he might secede and form an independent government of his own, leaving the northern capitalist to do the same; (3) or the northern capitalist might retain control of the whole government, in which case he would be obliged to abolish chattel slavery and spread the wage system into the South. We know now that the forces of social evolution were for the capitalist and against the slave owner, and therefore the third alternative was realized. For the South, the civil war was a revolutionary war.

It has been a favorite method of certain critics of Socialism to present evolution as being in contradiction to revolution. They speak of slow, gradual evolution as against sudden revolution. But even in science this apparent conflict has been resolved.

De Vries has shown that plants go through periods of apparent constancy, when whatever changes may be taking place are not visible to us. Then comes what might be called a

revolutionary period, when these plant forms "explode" and new species appear. Independent of this analogy it is much the same with society. The mode of wealth production which is in vogue in any country or period will be accompanied by social institutions in harmony with it. The ruling class will control both. But the members of that class cannot control the development of their own system of production. It is here, in the development of the processes of production, that evolution plays its most decisive part. At its base society is evolving new social forces, but the ruling class struggles to perpetuate institutions that are no longer in harmony with these new forces. Hence evolution proceeds apace in economics, but lags behind in social institutions. To take a familiar illustration: A boy of ten is dressed in a suit of clothes that fit him. But he goes on growing while the clothes remain the same. Presently, if the clothes last long enough, a contradiction in size appears and he gets a new suit. This simile is not perfect, because social institutions are not altogether petrified. But the ruling class is able to control and restrain social institutions to a much greater extent than in the case of the forces and processes of production. Again, changes in production

generate new social classes and develop new class conflicts. The new class demands social institutions in harmony with its own needs, and the new forces of production. The old class fights to retain the old institutions which gave it supremacy. But the new forces expand, the contradiction becomes more glaring, the class line sharpens and a social revolution becomes inevitable.

This theory has met with some desultory criticism, but none of the critics have been able as yet to present any thoroughgoing or systematic explanation of social phenomena. It is said, for instance, that class lines are not sharpening, but softening, and that the steady amelioration of the condition of the working class will eventually render a revolution unnecessary—we shall, so to speak, glide into the co-operative commonwealth almost without noticing it. This contention is not backed by any of those epoch-making generalizations which distinguish the Marxian conception, but is as a rule built upon a loose use of haphazard statistics which, when closely examined, often prove the opposite of what is expected of them.

Such a theory as this, if it is to be substantiated, must be shown to have some solid material foundation. The only foundation that

would be equal to supporting it would be to show that the worker receives an increasing share of the wealth he produces. But this is precisely what cannot be shown, because it plainly is not so. As Kautsky says: "The question of the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat . . . is primarily a question of increasing exploitation." And, he adds, "That this does increase Marx has shown a generation ago, and to my mind no one has yet refuted him. Whoever denies the increasing exploitation of the proletariat must first of all set about a refutation of Marx's "Capital."

It may be argued that this is immaterial so long as the worker is actually better off than he was. The highly problematical question as to how much the worker is "better off"—about which there is a wide divergence of opinion—we need not discuss here. It is quite certain that his material condition has not improved in any ratio comparable with the increased luxuries of his master.

The mass of the workers still inhabit miserably inadequate dwellings; the exploiters have abandoned their plain wooden houses for brown-stone palaces; the crew of an ocean greyhound still lives on "bones and bilge water"; the first-class passenger is fed and

lodged in a way that would have excited the envy of crowned heads a generation ago. The social parasite has given up the modest pony and dogcart of former days and whirls through the streets in a \$4,000 automobile—to the imminent deadly peril of a cowed, long-suffering public. The free, sovereign working citizen still travels on “shank’s pony,” or is hung up by the wrist in a nickel street car, much as he would have been in a mediæval torture chamber had he ventured to disagree with an ignorant village priest. If the two classes lived on separate planets and never saw each other, this increasing inequality might be disregarded. Coming into constant contact and contrast it means a psychological development that will some day find revolutionary expression.

Incautious thinkers have stumbled into the mistake of supposing that because the worker is increasingly exploited he must be physically and mentally deteriorating. This by no means follows; nor is it true. The exact opposite is proven by the facts. Considering the condition and interests of the worker, his conduct does seem wholly irrational and when we see him in action on election day, it does seem as if he could never have been more hopelessly stupid than he is—yet such undoubtedly is the case.

It is almost impossible to conceive the utter

darkness which enveloped the mind of the worker of seventy years ago. The change has been tremendous.

Says Kautsky: "Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of the last fifty years is the rapid and unbroken rise of the proletariat in moral and intellectual relations."

"One of the most striking and significant signs of the times," says Benjamin Kidd, rather overdrawing the picture, "is the spectacle of Demos, with new battle cries ringing in his ears, gradually emerging from the long silence of social and political serfdom. Not now does he come with the violence of revolution foredoomed to failure, but with slow and majestic progress which marks a natural evolution. [This was before De Vries revolutionized the evolution theory, then it was indeed "slow".] He is no longer unwashed and illiterate, for we have universal education. . . With his advent, Socialism has ceased to be a philanthropic sentiment merely."

As late as the middle of the last century the working class was feared as an uncouth beast which would wreck everything if ever it had the opportunity, and this fear was by no means confined to fossilized conservatives. In 1850 Rodbertus wrote: "The most threatening danger at present is that we shall have a new

barbarian invasion, this time coming from the interior of society itself to lay waste custom, civilization and wealth."

About the same time Heinrich Heine said: "This confession that the future belongs to the communist, I make in sorrow and the greatest anxiety. This is in no way a delusion. In fact, it is only with fear and shuddering that I think of the epoch when these dark iconoclasts come to power; with their callous hands they will destroy all the marble statues of beauty."

An atavistic, and wholly unjustified and vicious, survival of this fear is expressed by Mallock: "The emancipation of the average man would merely be the emancipation which a blind man achieves when he breaks away from his guide."

Since then, however, the change has been greater than the supposed possibilities warranted, and it is still proceeding at an ever accelerating pace. The communist worker of today, in all that relates to social philosophy, thinks more clearly than the professional intellectuals of the schools. His environment brings him in daily contact with the latest results of science in the field of mechanics and this is delivering him from the superstition inculcated in infancy. The professional intel-

lectual, bred to the occupation, is constantly engaged with ideas that have their roots in former modes of wealth production and his mind turns in vicious circles from which he finds no avenue of escape. Should he take up Socialism and enter the movement, his first and greatest surprise is to find himself surrounded by hundreds of workmen who are fundamentally and undoubtedly his intellectual superiors.

It is still considered the thing, among the majority of professors, to sneer at Socialists, but we have, in our thinking and in our field, applied scientific methods to an extent that only a few of them are beginning even to suspect. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that this increasing intelligence of the workers tends to soften class antagonism. True it tends to discourage riots and premature rebellions, and it does so because it enables the worker to comprehend their futility. It is precisely because increasing intelligence and experience has taught the worker this lesson that he now conducts his side of the class struggle in a systematic fashion, and this so far from eliminating class antagonisms really gives them organic shape and renders them much more important.

Once more I quote Kautsky, who well says:

"This struggle is no longer, as in 1789, a battle of unorganized mobs with no political form, with no insight into the relative strength of the contending factors, with no profound comprehension of the purposes of the struggle and the means to its solution; no longer a battle of mobs that can be deceived and bewildered by every rumor or accident. It is a battle of organized, intelligent masses, full of stability and prudence, that do not follow every impulse or explode over every insult, or collapse under every misfortune."

Those who regard labor unions as a means of avoiding ultimate revolution are drawing conclusions that are not well founded in the premises. The most vital unions are those most ready to do battle, and those who most clearly recognize that nothing can be gained except by fighting. Those unions which have no inkling of the class struggle, soon cease to be labor unions at all, except in name. The frank brutality with which organized capital treats its organized wage-slaves, using against them every weapon of the State, is teaching the more intelligent men in the ranks that no material relief can ever come until the master class is stripped of those terrible weapons—in short, a social revolution.

There are many other criticisms of the revo-

lution theory, but we have not space for them here. When carefully weighed, however, like the above they lead to, and not away from, the Marxian conclusions.

The great strength of the Marxian position is due to his unflinching fidelity to economic reality. He sought and found the solution of the social problem in the complex mechanism of capitalist society. He believed in Socialism not because it should be, but because it will be; not because it is in harmony with any set of ethical ideas, but because, with its present composition and tendencies, capitalism has no other possible outcome. The social revolution approaches not because we proclaim it, but we proclaim it because it is approaching and all its main elements are already here. As Dietzgen says: "The society of the future is contained in the present society as the young bird in the egg." The means of production have grown beyond the ability of their present owners to manage them for the good of society as a whole, therefore their claims to any right to continue to act for society in that capacity are invalid. First individual ownership proved inefficient and was swallowed up in class ownership. Now the administrative bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie is self-proclaimed, and social ownership is the only re-

maintaining alternative. This socializing of the means and instruments of production involves the transformation of existing property relations and social institutions—a social revolution.

With that revolution, as Engels maintains, man “is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from the mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now become master of his own social organization.”

In this direction all industrial tendencies are heading. The working class begins to realize the greatness of its task. Acting in behalf of society as a whole, it becomes the arbiter of destiny. In all countries, and in the teeth of gigantic difficulties, it gathers strength for the accomplishment of its historic mission—the abolition of class society, the emancipation of the human race.

III.

THE SOCIALIST THEORY OF PANICS.

That which is self-contradictory must be transitional; a house divided against itself cannot stand. Change is the law of all things, and the only thing in the universe that never changes is the law of change. Everywhere in the cosmos new combinations arise. If some endure longer than others, it is, so far as we can see, because their parts are more harmoniously related, while other less fortunate combinations are the victims of an internecine war, carried on between the various parts of the whole, and resulting in rapid, and, perhaps, violent disintegration.

Ninety-five thousand years is Morgan's estimate of the longevity of tribal Communism, and when we examine that social state and find that it contained no private property, no class divisions, no unemployed problem, we are able to form some opinion as to the reasons for its stability. On the other hand, capitalism, which contains all these things, and many more of the same nature, is tottering to

its fall after a reign of little more than a century.

The truth is that the existing social order is a mass of contradictions; its main feature is the antagonism of its parts. To explain how these antagonisms arose, in what they consist, and how they may be abolished, is the task of sociology. So far, the efforts of the official sociologists have resulted in a dismal failure. "We have no real science of society," wailed Benjamin Kidd, and it was impossible for a thinker of his theological tendencies and class affiliations to perceive the reason.

Perhaps no greater misfortune could befall any man, following the university for a profession, than to hold a chair in sociology, or its subdivision, political economy. The most rudimentary attempt to apply to sociology those illuminating methods which have transformed physics and biology, brings him face to face with the fact that the people who have endowed his chair, and to whom he is indebted for his salary, belong to a class of useless social parasites, who expect his theories to harmonize with the way they get their living. And so he must choose between the loss of his position, and becoming a practitioner of the noble art of "how not to do it."

In political economy the case is even worse.

The professors of political economy have danced on hot plates, and in their efforts to escape the truth have exhibited an intellectual dexterity that has made their co-called science a perpetual comedy. At last, realizing instinctively the hopelessness of their position, they have stopped thinking altogether, and have degenerated into mere collectors of statistics.

Nowhere does this colossal incapacity, resulting from compulsory self-stultification, appear more clearly than in their abortive speculations as to the causes of panics.

In point of absurdity we are fairly safe in awarding the cap and bells to the English economist, Stanley Jevons. Endowed with a brain which had much in common with that of Mr. Mallock, he succeeded in attracting much attention to his theory of sun spots. It appeared to Jevons that sun spots showed periodical fluctuations which ran in cycles of about ten years. If the presence of many sun spots meant unusual activity on the face of the sun, that would mean the radiation of more heat, which would mean more sunshine for the earth, consequently better crops, and, therefore, a season of prosperity. On the other hand, when the sun spots were scarce, sunshine would decrease, cold and wet weather

would prevail, crops would fail, and then would come the panic.

Unfortunately, Sir William Herschel, the greatest astronomer of that day, declared that it was impossible to say whether or not the sun spots had anything to do with the climate, deciding that on this point "nothing decisive can be obtained." Again, the dates of the various panics contradicted or supported the sun spot dates with an impartiality which led Mr. Jevons to express his "disgust" with the behavior of both.

These difficulties, however, did not prevent the publication of an extensive literature on the theory and the printing of enough books to load a ship

In his "Commercial Crises of the Nineteenth Century," H. M. Hyndman dismisses Jevons' theory as follows: "This theory was actually accepted for a time, until what was perhaps the worst crisis of the century came in the same year with one of the finest harvests ever known on the planet, and when also the sun's disc was exceptionally afflicted with spots. Then it became apparent to the most credulous that the spots on the sun had as much influence on industrial crises as the spots on the leopard in the Zoological Gardens; and that the genius before whose shrine our professors

of political economy at Oxford and Cambridge still prostrate themselves had only added another to his long list of blunders."

In the first half of the last century panics had become a recognized item in English social life, and many theories as to their causes were put forward. The theory that there was too much paper that was not backed by gold until people lost confidence in it, was pressed by so many that in 1844 the Peel Bank Act was passed. This law divided the Bank of England into a banking department and an issue department. The banking department could only get notes from the issue department by depositing an equal amount of gold with the latter. When the banking department was called upon for deposits, in order to get the gold it had to return the notes, which were thus withdrawn from circulation. This act had no effect in staving off panics, but instead had to be itself suspended during the three successive panics of 1847, 1857 and 1866, the first suspension occurring only three years after the passing of the act. A similar act adopted by Austria met the same fate.

In fact, panics seem to pay little attention to monetary systems or currency regulations.

Prof. Jones, of Wisconsin University, who took his degree by writing on this question,

and whose book is perhaps the most extensive extant on the subject, says: "The diversity of monetary conditions among the principal countries of the world, coupled with the fact that most of them have been visited by crises, warns us from attaching too much importance to details at this point."

We may here dismiss that group of idealists who hold the "psychological" theory of crises. Horace White, who is a type of this school, observes: "These undulations of trade, of alternate activity and depression in business, have their root in the mental and moral constitution of mankind." This is, of course, the precise opposite of the position of the materialist who maintains that things mental and moral grow out of the material facts, and that these latter are the "root."

"Loss of confidence" is a result of the panic, and has no place in any statement of the "causes."

Insufficiency of gold, wild-cat speculation, the greed of trusts, and many other things of the same order undoubtedly accentuate the horrors of a panic, and, it may be conceded, that some of them hasten its coming. But he would be a bold Socialist, or rather no Socialist at all, who would assert that any one, or all of the above mentioned items combined,

would be sufficient to explain the phenomenon we call a panic.

We shall now take up the Socialist explanation of this problem. We shall here dispense with that analysis of the origin and growth of capitalism, bringing with it those various antagonisms essential to its nature, which has been so brilliantly presented by Engels in his reply to Duehring.

But before proceeding to the main theory we shall consider the antagonism described by Engels as "an antagonism between the organization of production in the individual workshop and the anarchy of production in society generally." This anarchy in general production has played an important part in all crises. As no one capitalist knew what other capitalists were doing with regard to the supply of any commodity, all engaged in a mad rush to get to the market first and dispose of their goods.

It is just at this point that the Revisionists, who claim to have outgrown Marx and discarded his obsolete theories, imagine they have found an excellent foothold for their criticism. Anarchy of production, Bernstein maintains, belongs to the early stages of capitalism, and the crises, produced by that cause, will disappear as capitalism reaches later stages.

This was to be accomplished by the trusts regulating production according to the normal demand. Unfortunately for Marx, this could not be foreseen in his day, so his theory explodes and his self-appointed successor, Bernstein, comes forward to take his place. It must be a little disconcerting, however, to have so many Socialists object to the substitution.

Nay, the trusts had already sufficiently regulated industry as to break through the cycle of crises so that they did not reach over into the twentieth century, although one was supposed to be due about the beginning. The appearance of a panic at this time, 'in the most trustified country in the world, while it may not shake Bernstein's faith, will probably lose him some followers.

"Their (the Revisionists') mistake lies," says Louis Boudin, one of the foremost Marxian scholars in America, "in assuming that the 'anarchy of production' is, according to Marx, the only cause of commercial crises. As a matter of fact, the cause mentioned is not only not the only, but not even the chief cause of crises mentioned by Marx."

That chief cause, says the same writer, is a "constant" factor which no trust can ever regulate, and which cannot be abolished until the capitalist regime is abolished. It is "the

dual position of the laborer as a seller of his labor-power and a purchaser of the products of his labor-power, and the creation of a surplus-product flowing therefrom which must result in an overproduction of commodities quite apart from the 'anarchy of production.' "

Overproduction is undoubtedly the real cause of panics. This theory is referred to as "orthodox" and "rather stereotyped," both of which criticisms apply with even greater force to Gravitation and the diurnal motion of the earth. The only thing that is relevant is the question of its truth. Revisionism, with an air of profound wisdom, hints like Hamlet, "I could an' I would," and suggests that great truths have been discovered, which are destined to replace the fallacies of Marx and Engels. Some day we shall be told what these epoch-making principles are, and "the jig will be up." For the present, however, revolutionary conservatives will have to wait until Bernstein lets the cat out of the bag.

One reason for the orthodoxy of the overproduction theory is that its truth is so readily perceived. The great Utopians made no mistake on this point. Robert Owen understood what had happened at the close of the war of 1815.

He said: "The war was the great and most

extravagant customer of farmers, manufacturers, and other producers of wealth, and many during this period became very wealthy.

* * * And on the day on which the peace was signed, the great customer of the producers died, and prices fell as the demand diminished, until the prime cost of the articles required for war could not be obtained.

* * * Barns and farmyards were full, warehouses loaded, and such was our artificial state of society that this very superabundance of wealth was the sole cause of the existing distress. Burn the stock in the farmyards and warehouses, and prosperity would immediately recommence, in the same manner as if the war had continued."

Fourier called the crisis "a crisis from plethora," when "abundance becomes the source of distress."

Jones says: "The first writer to furnish a consistent theory of the relation between crises and the industrial problem generally was Rodbertus."

Rodbertus' book made its appearance in the middle of the last century, in the form of a letter to his friend Kirchmann. Of this letter Marx said: "It sees through the nature of capitalist production."

Rodbertus says: "If every participant in ex-

change always retained the entire product of his labor, if his purchasing power, therefore, consisted in the market value of the entire product, then no glut could arise from an increase of productiveness; either in respect to any one or to all commodities, until all the participants had received enough of them for their use, until more of them had been produced than is required by society."

Marx, in the second volume of *Capital*, expresses the same theory thus: "The production of surplus value, and with it individual consumption may be in a flourishing condition, and yet a large part of the commodities may have entered into consumption only apparently, while in reality they may still remain unsold in the hands of the dealers; in other words, they may still be actually in the market. Now, one stream of commodities follows another, and finally it becomes obvious that the previous stream had been only apparently absorbed by consumption. The commodity capitals compete with one another for a place on the market. The succeeding ones, in order to be able to sell, do so below price. The former streams have not yet been utilized when the payment for them is due. Their owners must declare their insolvency, or sell at any price in order to fulfill their obligations. This sale

has nothing whatever to do with the actual condition of the demand. It is merely a question of demand for payment, of the pressing necessity of transforming commodities into money. Then the crisis comes."

H. M. Hyndman, one of the foremost Socialist scholars of England says: "The times of greatest distress for the mass of the people now are the times when there is a complete glut of the commodities which they need and which they make."

By far the clearest and most graphic of all the statements of this theory is the one by Engels, in his reply to Dühring: "Since 1825, when the first general crisis broke out, the whole industrial and commercial world, production and exchange among all civilized peoples and their more or less barbaric hangers-on, are thrown out of joint about once every ten years. Commerce is at a standstill, the markets are glutted, products accumulate, as multitudinous as they are unsalable, hard cash disappears, credit vanishes, factories are closed, the mass of the workers are in want of the means of subsistence, because they have produced too much of the means of subsistence; bankruptcy follows upon bankruptcy, execution upon execution. The stagnation lasts for years; productive forces and products

are wasted and destroyed wholesale, until the accumulated mass of commodities finally filter off, more or less depreciated in value, until production and exchange gradually begin to move again. Little by little the pace quickens. It becomes a trot. The industrial trot breaks into a canter, the canter in turn grows into the headlong gallop of a perfect steeplechase of industry, commercial credit, and speculation, which finally, after breakneck leaps, ends where it began—in the ditch of a crisis. And so over and over again.”

Professor Jones describing Rodbertus' theory, very cleverly depicts and illustrates the futility of the methods adopted by capitalists to stave off the panic: “The accumulation of a surplus implies a curtailment of the market. The attempt to employ this surplus productively calls for an expanding market, and if this is not found the profits of capital invested in production begin to fall. So long as the capitalist attempts to prevent this fall of profits by reducing wages, he reduces the demand and tightens the noose which strangles industry. Like the backing horse with the lines wound around the hub, every movement to comply with the apparent demands of the situation only tightens the pressure.”

The women workers of New York held a

meeting in 1893 to discuss the panic of that year. They were not economic scholars, but they concluded from their own observations that the only hope was in the consumption of the things which still remained on the overloaded market. They said to their messenger to the rich women of the city: "Tell them not to cut off their luxuries."

That the present panic, like the rest, is the consequence of overstrained markets, seems to be the opinion of the Wall Street Journal, which has about the best news service in the world. The issue of Friday, November 15th, contains the following:

"Ever since the beginning of the year, thoughtful observers of the situation have been looking for a contraction of business. These observers, however, were mostly in the East and in closer touch with the strictly financial conditions, so that they could feel the strain which was being experienced in all the international markets."

So, "the ditch of a crisis" is the result of the gap between the price of labor power and the value of the commodities which that labor power produces. The trust may regulate industry and modify the anarchy in production, but it can not reduce that gap. On the contrary it does actually widen the chasm by increasing the

productivity of labor more rapidly than it increases wages, thus increasing the ratio in which labor is exploited, and, though wages remain stationary or even advance, really reducing the worker's purchasing power relatively to the increased value of his labor products.

So "the vicious circle," in spite of all that trusts can do, grows more vicious, and its movement, as Engels says, "becomes more and more a spiral and must come to an end, like the movement of the planets, by a collision with the center."

The one insoluble problem of capitalism is to dispose of its surplus products. They remain in its system, producing convulsions, which must eventually result in its death. Its hopeless inability to reconcile that contradiction guarantees the impossibility of its perpetuation.

The soil is prolific as ever, the bowels of the earth teem with the fuel and metals which men require. We have the most highly productive machinery the world ever saw, and workers by the million beg the chance to keep the wheels revolving. Society possesses everything necessary to abundantly supply all the wants of all her children. But class ownership of the means of production grips her like

a palsy, and poverty stalks abroad in the midst of plenty.

Says Rodbertus: "What, then, should society do? She must step out of this fatal circle, in which she is driven about by prejudices alone, and replace the 'natural' laws, in so far as they are harmful, by rational ones! For this she needs but clear vision and moral strength! It is the part of political economists to sharpen the first. Should the last be lacking for a free resolve, history will indeed have to swing the lash of revolution over her again."

IV.

THE PARIS COMMUNE

In the drama of European history France has always played a leading role. She has given us a classic instance of a social revolution, an international revolutionary song, and a brief but brilliant example of a working class administration of affairs.

If ever the argument, made by Herbert Spencer, that tyranny is no less tyranny when it is ushered in by popular vote, had a historical vindication it was when the people of France, by a vote of over seven millions, almost the entire vote, elevated President Napoleon to Emperor Napoleon III. In 1848, the "Citizen-King," Louis Phillipe, had succeeded in goading Paris into rebellion. The advocates of another strain of royalty (the Bourbon) had plotted against his life and the "Citizen-King" thought that this could be remedied by abolishing free speech, free assemblage, and the freedom of the press. This stupidity brought matters to a head when he forbade the holding in Paris of a "Reform Banquet" which was to have taken

place on Washington's birthday (February 22). With this performance, Parisian blood boiled over, barricades appeared in the streets, the "Citizen-King" fled to England disguised as "Mr. Smith," where he died two years later.

A Republic was proclaimed and Louis Napoleon, an enterprising gentleman, related to the first Napoleon and sharing his tricks, was elected President by a vote of five and a half millions.

Not satisfied with this, he made plans to become master of France as his uncle had been. This he accomplished by a statesmanlike device called a "coup d'etat,"—a stroke of state. It consisted in the midnight arrest or assassination of all those obnoxious persons who were known to be opposed to his schemes, and was accomplished on the night of Dec. 2nd, 1851, in the third year of his presidency. One year later he was proclaimed, as we have said, Emperor Napoleon III, by a big popular vote.

His midnight slaughter of those opposed to him excites no horror in the minds of those bourgeois historians who cannot find language that is permissible with which to villify the Commune.

He gratified his ambition by ruling France for the next eighteen years. As that period

drew to a close, he saw with regret the declining popularity of his house, and afraid the crown might go to some other family on his death, he made up his mind, such as it was, to do something to recover lost prestige.

He knew that much might be accomplished by an appeal to the French love of military glory. He saw the rising power of Prussia threatening France with rivalry. So he decided on a war with Prussia.

He picked a quarrel about the rumor that Leopold of Hohenzollern, a kinsman of the king of Prussia, William I., was to be made king of Spain. This was stoutly denied, and in order to prevent trouble, Leopold withdrew from among the candidates for the Spanish crown. Napoleon, rushing blindly on his fate, insisted that Leopold should swear not to accept the honor at any future time. This was refused and Napoleon at once declared war—July, 1870.

Being the aggressor, he at once crossed the frontier into Germany. On August 4th, the battle of Weissenburg was fought and the German army, led by the Crown Prince, was victorious. Two days later the German forces defeated the French army under Marshal MacMahon at Worth. France was no longer the aggressor. The entire German forces moved

into France and put the French on the defensive.

After various encounters in different parts of France, the French were driven from all sides into Sedan. On September 1st, Sedan, with 80,000 soldiers, surrendered, and the Emperor Napoleon, who was among them, gave up his sword to King William and was sent to live at the Castle of Wilhelmshöhe. A few days later two German armies under the Crown Prince marched on Paris to lay siege to it, and on September 19th the investment began.

In the meantime a new French army had been raised, with a declared view of relieving Paris. Marshal Bazaine was surrounded at Metz and October 27th capitulated with his whole army of 170,000 men.

And thus it came to pass that the year 1871 opened with the city of Paris surrounded by the German armies, with no prospect of succor from without.

When Napoleon surrendered, M. Thiers and a group of lawyers, who had previously held municipal offices, inaugurated the third republic with M. Thiers for President.

After the Commune fell, Marx wrote "The Civil War in France," which was sent out as a manifesto on the Commune, to the members of the International Workingmen's Associa-

tion, by the General Council. In that brief but penetrating history Marx gives a description of the character and career of Thiers in which Thiers is embalmed as a fly in amber. It is too long to be quoted in full, so we give the following extracts:

"Thiers, that monstrous gnome, has charmed the French bourgeoisie for almost half a century, because he is the most consummate intellectual expression of their own class-corruption. Before he became a statesman he had already proved his lying powers as an historian. The chronicle of his public life is the record of the misfortunes of France. Banded, before 1830, with the Republicans, he slipped into office under Louis Phillipe by betraying his protector Lafitte, ingratiating himself with the king by exciting mob-riots against the clergy, during which the Church of Saint Germain l'Auxerrois and the Archbishop's palace were plundered, and by acting the minister-spy upon, and the jail-accoucheur of, the Duchess de Berri. The massacre of the Republicans in the rue Transnonian, and the subsequent infamous laws of September against the press and the right of association, were his work.

"Despite his versatility of talent and shiftiness of purpose, this man has his whole lifetime been wedded to the most fossil routine. It is

self-evident that to him the deeper undercurrents of modern society remained forever hidden; but even the most palpable changes on its surface were abhorrent to a brain all the vitality of which had fled to the tongue. Thus he never tired of denouncing as a sacrilege any deviation from the old French protective system. When a minister of Louis Phillipe, he railed at railways as a wild chimera; and when in opposition under Louis Bonaparte, he branded as a profanation every attempt to reform the rotten French army system. Never in his long political career has he been guilty of a single—even the smallest—measure of any practical use.

“Thiers was consistent only in his greed for wealth and his hatred of the men that produce it. Having entered his first ministry under Louis Phillipe poor as Job, he left it a millionaire. His last ministry under the same king (of the 1st of March, 1840), exposed him to public taunts of peculation in the Chamber of Deputies, to which he was content to reply by tears—a commodity he deals in as freely as Jules Favre, or any other crocodile. At Bordeaux his first measure for saving France from impending financial ruin was to endow himself with three millions a year, the first and the last word of the ‘Economical Republic,’ the

vista of which he had opened to his Paris electors in 1869. One of his former colleagues of the Chamber of Deputies of 1830, himself a capitalist and, nevertheless, a devoted member of the Paris Commune, M. Beslay, lately addressed Thiers thus in a public placard: 'The enslavement of labor by capital has always been the cornerstone of your policy, and from the very day you saw the Republic of Labor installed at the Hotel de Ville, you have never ceased to cry out to France: "These are criminals!"' A master in small state roguery, a virtuoso in perjury and treason, a craftsman in all the petty stratagems, cunning device, and base perfidies of parliamentary warfare; never scrupling, when out of office, to fan a revolution, and to stifle it in blood when at the helm of state, and with class prejudices standing him in the place of ideas."

Thiers and his colleagues rushed through a sham election of delegates to a National Assembly which met at Bordeaux, until it grew afraid the proximity of so many workingmen, and moved to Versailles, which had long served as a sleeping chamber for the kings of France. The scheme of Thiers and the bourgeoisie exploiters generally was to re-establish a monarchy which would have despotic power enough to throw the cost of the whole stupid

business directly on the shoulders of the wealth producers.

The Second Empire had more than doubled the national debt, and it was clear that Prussia would exact an enormous indemnity, and a really representative republic might attempt to put the burdens on the shoulders of those who had created them.

The one obstacle of this whole plan was—Paris. Therefore Paris must be sacrificed, and all the time Thiers was boasting his determination to defend Paris at all costs, and it was being given out that “the Governor of Paris will never capitulate.” General Trochu was telling the bourgeois mayors in secret confabs that defense was impossible, and negotiations were going forward to repeat the disgrace of Sedan and Metz in the yielding up of Paris. It was a joke passed from mouth to mouth among the officers of the army, who well knew that the so-called defense was a well-understood mockery.

On the 28th of January the mask was dropped and Paris was formally surrendered to the Prussians. If, however, the Prussians expected to be masters of the city when they marched into it, they were doomed to disappointment.

The Parisian workers had organized themselves into the “National Guard,” and Thiers

knew better than ask them to give up their arms, at least until he was driven to it.

He had contracted in the surrender to disarm a certain number of French soldiers, but he was compelled to select the "Guard Mobile" for that humiliation.

Lissagaray says: "The Prussians entered Paris on the 1st of March. * * * Black flags hung from the houses, but the deserted streets, the closed shops, the dried up fountains, the veiled statues of the Place de la Concorde, the gas not lighted at night, still more pregnantly announced a town in its agony. * * * A cafe in the Champs Elysees, which had opened its doors to the victors, was ransacked. There was but one "grand seigneur" in the Fauberg St. Germain to offer his house to the Prussians."

The Prussian soldiers were in reality prisoners in the city they were supposed to have captured. They were assigned to certain parks, etc., and hemmed in with barricades. They were zealously watched over by the Parisians, and were thus rendered as harmless as if they had been in Berlin.

This, of course, made it impossible for Thiers to carry out his contracts with Bismarck—of delivering France to the Prussians. It was decided, therefore, to disarm the National

Guard and thus throw down the last bulwark that stood between France and the enemy. This was easier said than done, for the National Guard had no intention of allowing itself to be disarmed.

It was the attempt at this disarmament on the 18th day of March that precipitated the revolution which led to the Commune, and which gives it its date.

The National Guard had bought their own cannon and kept them in the artillery parks in various parts of the city. The storm center proved to be the park on the heights of Montmartre. At 4 o'clock in the morning on the 18th of March these cannon were seized by the Republican Guard under Lecomte, General of Division.

The National Guard were surprised, and while they were gathering to arms the artillery of the Republican Guard had yoked their horses to the cannon, after a bungling delay, and got as far as the corner of the Rue Lepsic and the Rue des Abbesses, where they were stopped by a crowd of women and young men. A detachment of infantry sent to their rescue was surrounded by the crowd and disarmed; as they proved later, they had no intention of killing or wounding the people, and so only made a show of resistance.

The 88th of the line fraternized with the people and showed its sympathy with the National Guard. The cannon were taken back to where they had been stolen from, and General Lecomte, who had four times commanded the troops to fire on the people and been disobeyed each time, was arrested, but fell into the hands of some of the more indignant soldiers, who, acting on their own initiative, shot him, and at the same time Clement Thomas, whom they caught playing the part of spy—making drawings of their defenses while disguised.

The Central Committee, which had acted provisionally for the Parisians, now declared its work over and called for the regular election of a permanent body to administer the affairs of Paris. The election was called for the 22nd, but the morning after the proclamation of the date the walls were found to have been covered in the night with posters appealing to the citizens to ignore the election. This created considerable confusion, and before it could be cleared up the date was changed to the 26th.

The City of Paris had always been a source of uneasiness to the ruling class; they had always been afraid to give it the same municipal privileges granted to other French municipalities, and now the mayors of the respective

arrondissements, caught between two fires, living in the revolution but sympathizing with the reactionary assembly at Versailles, were determined to do something toward a compromise. They journeyed to Versailles and proposed that Paris be placed on the same footing as other French municipalities as an alternative to forming a Commune independent of the National Assembly. They expected this measure to bring a cordial response, instead of which it was treated with contempt. Already the bloodthirsty Thiers was scheming to drown any revolt in a sea of blood.

The mayors returned to Paris disgusted and gave mostly a half-hearted support to the Commune.

On the 26th of March the election took place. There were 20 arrondissements (about like our wards); there were over a quarter of a million voters and 106 members elected. There were two tickets in the field, one which favored a Commune and one opposed. The revolutionary ticket was victorious in 16 arrondissements; the reactionary ticket in the remaining four. In one of these latter, the 16th, Victor Hugo was the candidate of the Communards and was defeated.

As to whether the Communards had far-reaching ideas may be seen from the following,

which is taken from a reply to their bourgeois critics, which was published in the "Moniteur":

"Are the workers, who produce everything and enjoy nothing, who suffer accumulated misery, the fruit of their labor and their sweat, forever to be exposed to outrage? Are they never to be allowed to work unmolested at their emancipation without raising a concert of maledictions?

"Will the bourgeois their elder brothers having accomplished nearly a century ago their emancipation, and preceded them in the track of revolution, never comprehend that the turn for the emancipation of the proletariat has arrived? * * *

"The proletariat, in spite of the permanent menacing of their rights, the absolute denial of all their legitimate aspirations, the ruin of their country, and of all their hopes, have comprehended their imperative duty and absolute right to be masters of their own destiny, and to secure their triumph by taking the power into their own hands. * * * The march of progress interrupted for the moment is beginning anew and the proletariat, in spite of everything, will accomplish their emancipation."

It must be conceded, however that the statement of the Central Committee from which

the above is taken was above the social intelligence of the average of the Communards, and it shows that Socialists were well represented on the Central Committee.

Two days after its election the Commune was proclaimed, the 28th, and on the 29th it formed itself into ten committees. These were (1) the Executive, (2) the Military, (3) Committee on Supply, (4) Finance, (5) Justice, (6) General Safety, (7) Committee on Labor, Industry and Exchange. This committee was instructed to attend to the dissemination of Socialist doctrines. (8) Public Service, (9) Foreign Affairs, (10) Committee of Instruction. This last committee was to attend to education and was instructed to keep it exclusively secular.

As the summary of the acts of the Commune given by Engels admits of no further abbreviation, we will quote here:

"On the 30th the Commune abolished the conscription and the standing army, and declared the National Guard, to which all citizens capable of bearing arms were to belong, to be the only force with the right to bear arms; it remitted all rents of dwellings from October, 1870, to April, 1871, such rent as had already been paid to be deducted from future payments; and stopped all sales of

pledges in the city's pawnshops. The same day the foreigners elected to the Commune were confirmed in their functions, since the 'the flag of the Commune is that of the Universal Republic.' On the 1st of April it was decided that the highest salary of a functionary of the Commune, whether a member or otherwise, was not to exceed 6,000 francs (\$1,200) a year. On the following day was decreed the separation of Church and State, the abolition of all State payments for religious purposes, and the transformation of all ecclesiastical wealth into national property. As a consequence of this, all religious symbols, dogmas, prayers—in short, all things appertaining to the sphere of the individual conscience—were on the 8th of April ordered to be banished from the schools, an order which was carried out as soon as possible. On the 5th, in retaliation for the daily murder of Communards captured by the Versailles troops, there was enacted a decree for the arrest of hostages, but it was never carried out. On the 6th, the guillotine was fetched out by the 137th battalion of the National Guard, and publicly burnt amid loud popular applause. On the 12th, the Commune ordered the triumphal column on the Place Vendome, which had been constructed by Napoleon I. after the

war of 1809 out of captured cannon, to be overthrown, as it was a symbol of Chauvinism and mutual hatred among the nations. This was accomplished on the 16th of May.

"On the 16th of April the Commune issued an order for a statistical account of all factories and workshops which had been closed by the employers; for the elaboration of plans for their management by the workingmen hitherto engaged in them, who were to be formed into co-operative societies for the purpose; and, also, for the federation of these societies into one great co-operative organization. On the 20th, it abolished the night work of bakers, as also the register offices for procuring employment, which, since the Second Empire, had been the monopoly of certain police-appointed scoundrels, exploiters of the worst kind. The matter was henceforward placed in the hands of the mayoralties of the twenty arrondissements of Paris. On the 30th of April it decreed the abolition of pawnshops, as being incompatible with the right of workmen to their tools and to credit. On the 5th of May it ordered the destruction of the chapel erected in expiation of the execution of Louis XVI."

The motion to destroy the column on the Place Vendome, which was carried with acclaim, read as follows:

“Considering that the imperial column in the Place Vendome is a monument of barbarity, a symbol of brutal force and false glory, an affirmation of Chauvinism, a negation of international rights, a permanent insult of the victor to the vanquished, a perpetual outrage against one of the three great principles of the French Republic, Fraternity, therefore the column on the Place Vendome shall be demolished.”

Perhaps the greatest blunder of the Commune was its failure to take possession of the Bank of France. With the bank in its hands the whole of the bourgeoisie of France would have been supplicating the assembly at Versailles to make peace with the Commune. As Engels says, it “was worth more than ten thousand hostages.”

The powers which were destined to overthrow this first working class administration had been gathering in April, and they burst forth in May.

Vesinier, editor of the “Official Journal” of the Commune, thus describes the forces hurled against the Commune by the tigerish bourgeoisie:

“The old Municipal Guard of the monarchy, all the ex-sergeants de ville of the Empire, Corsican bravos, slaughterers and garroters of

the people for twenty years, Chouans, Vendéans, and the Pontifical zouaves of Charrette, rough and fanatical Bretons, half-savage Turcos, a few regiments of the line, forced to march in the midst of these reactionary hordes, and a corps of cavalry under the command of the Marquis de Galifet, an old friend of the Tuileries, and a ferocious and bloodthirsty officer, full of valor when women, children and disarmed and chained-up prisoners were to be butchered, but a coward in the face of a foreign enemy invading our country."

Such was the army of Versailles that overthrew the Commune. Even in its methods of warfare it was despicable. One of its tricks was for companies, when approaching the Communards, to pretend to wish to change sides and show its wish by advancing with muskets reversed. Then, when at close quarters, and the Communards had been taken off their guard, to suddenly swing their weapons around and mow down their unsuspecting victims.

The infamous Galifet, after the defeat of the Commune, shot, in cold blood, some 40,000 National Guards and about 10,000 women and children. His contention was that the men might rebel again; such women would breed rebellious children; and such children would

perpetuate the revolutionary ideas of their fathers.

And so ended this premature attempt of the working class to emancipate itself from wage slavery; drowned by the ferocious bourgeoisie in blood of its brave defenders. But the victory of the working class was only postponed. We wait until, in the evolutionary process, the hour of our release shall strike.

V.

SPALDING ON "SOCIAL QUESTIONS"

When the good bishop undertakes to warn the over-trustful laborers against the real enemies of labor he delivers himself thus :

"The laborers, and all who identify themselves with their cause, should have a care first of all that they be true men—provident, self-restrained, kindly, sober, frugal, and helpful; and that this may be possible, also religious. The foe of labor is not capital, but ignorance and vice. In the whole English-speaking world, at least, its worst enemy is drink. More than a combination of all employers, the saloon has power to impoverish and degrade workingmen."

The linking together of "ignorance" and "vice" is well done, and they are probably even more closely related than the bishop suspects. There is much to be said for the theory which makes the former the parent of the latter. The terrible effects upon society of the ignorance of its members are incalculable, but we confess our faith in the bishop's condemna-

tion of ignorance is badly shaken by his disparagement of knowledge, already cited in a previous lecture.

After the bishop has rated mere knowledge as the inferior of mere belief, it is by no means easy to see how he can logically object to ignorance. Belief which has no foundation in knowledge, which is precisely the kind our author exalts, is the most dogmatic when the believer possesses the least information.

Here Spalding seems to think—nay, he plainly says—that drink is the worst enemy of labor. On another occasion, addressing another audience he seemed to get a different idea.

Then he said, quoting various opinions as to the cause of the misery existing in society: "Alcohol, it has been asserted, is the supreme evil, and yet, the countless millions of Mohammedans and Buddhists are sober, but unspeakably wretched." He had probably been reading "Merrie England" where Blatchford says: "The people of Sicily are temperate as dogs, and they are treated like dogs."

No matter how much the bishop may waver as to whether labor's misery is caused by drink or something else, there is one point on which he never boggles—it must not be laid at the door of capital.

The vacillation which vitiates the bishop's

teaching as to drink extends to his views on that closely related subject, the food question.

The bishop is a great patriot. Ecclesiastical dignitaries learned long ago that one of the surest paths to state influence and emolument is patriotism. They have, therefore, in spite of the international character of their own organization, thrummed all the strings of national patriotism. So the Catholic church in Germany and Spain is a staunch supporter of monarchy, and the same church in America is quite as ardent in its belief in a "republican form of government."

Trifling inconsistencies of this kind do not disturb the serene peace of bishops. Spalding stoutly maintains that in many respects this country excels all others. In it, he says: "There is diffused among the masses of the people a well-being and comfort such as exists in no other land."

This "well-being and comfort" manifests itself in various ways, among which he notes "the wholesomeness of their food."

When we have made all proper allowances for the fact that this statement was made before Sinclair wrote the "Jungle," and are still wondering where the bishop obtained his immense fund of simplicity, we come across another passage a few pages further on in the

book, which brings out once more the bishop's fatal tendency to contradict himself.

Now his complacency has departed and he is in a denunciatory mood. "Our present economic and commercial systems," says he, "are subversive of civilization." And among the reasons given for this sweeping indictment is one which the bishop calmly advances as though he had never said anything on that question before. "Our present economic and commercial systems are subversive of civilization" because they see no wrong in "the adulteration of food and drink."

There is, of course, no way of discovering which of these two things the bishop really believed; whether the people have wholesome food or adulterated food. Perhaps it was possible, with a simplicity such as he occasionally displays, to believe that food and drink might be adulterated without ceasing to be wholesome. Even had he denied this, and thus left himself stranded in a dilemma of his own creation, the rest of his book shows that he would never have consented to any meddling interference on the part of the state. Such Socialistic institutions as food inspectors and pure food laws have no place in the bishop's scheme of society.

That this crime of the adulteration of food

and drink is due to our leaving our food and drink supply in private hands would probably never have dawned on the bishop's mind. England, however, produced an ultra-conservative who was able to see this, although he failed to see many other things that were equally conspicuous.

Alfred Tennyson, the English poet laureate, said:

“A company forges the wine,
And the vitriol madness works into the ruffian's head
Till the filthy by-lane rings with the shrieks of his
wretched wife;
And chalk, and alum, and plaster, are sold to the poor
for bread.
And the spirit of murder works in the very means
of life.”

We are beginning to pride ourselves on the intelligence of our age, and speak of certain superstitions as belonging to the ignorant and reprehensible past. One of these superstitions is that of “original sin” which was seriously taught as recently as to come plainly within reach of our own memories.

This change in our mental attitude of which we are so proud, the bishop, while acknowledging, deplores:

“As a people we have been, and probably still are, believers in the fundamental error that denies the original taint in man's nature; and hence we are persuaded that, in a society

like ours, where the restraints, oppressions, and injustices of past ages have ceased to exist, the tendency to higher modes of thought and conduct, to purer and worthier life, is as irresistible as the laws of nature."

Again: "It is a truth known to every mother and every nurse that man is born not only weak and ignorant, but with such a tendency to what is vicious, that each generation of children, if left to the impulse of their will, would inevitably relapse into barbarism. The bent of human nature is toward what is beneath, and the natural course of society is downward."

All that evolutionary science has accomplished has gone for naught so far as the Bishop of Peoria is concerned. For him it is as though Darwin and Spencer and Haeckel and their great co-workers had never lived, and Spalding seems to wish in his heart they had never been born.

The bishop seems to think that the destructive and combative tendencies of the child lend support to his discredited theory of original sin. The scientific explanation of this phenomena, presented by Ernest Haeckel, in the "biogenetic principle," has probably never come under the bishop's notice, nevertheless that theory completely refutes the bishop's contention.

When the bishop discusses what he and his

co-workers might do for the workers, he seems to contemplate abandoning his present calling and taking up the profession of literature. He says:

"We may show them how a cultivated mind is a perpetual invitation and opportunity to raise one's self to higher and more profitable occupations, to acquaint one's self with the best thought contained in the best literature, and thus to make one's self at home with the noblest minds of all ages and countries; how in thus opening up an inexhaustible supply of spiritual nourishment, it gives one the freedom, not of a city, though the most glorious, but of the world, from the dawn of history, even to the present hour."

This is excellent and would be still more so if we could forget that among those things which our author decried as "mere" knowledge, and which did so little to influence our characters, literature came in for special mention.

Even if this new attitude is the correct one, as seems to be the case, it is of no avail, for it seems to the bishop that only a few elect could ever profit by it. He laments:

"The crowd neither follow in the footsteps of the noblest characters, nor read the best books, nor love the master-works of genius. It may, indeed, be said to be a law of human nature that attraction from below is stronger

than attraction from above. The multitude live in the senses, not in the soul; and the life of the senses is contact with material objects."

This reproof of the crowd for not reading the best books is especially edifying when we think of that "index expurgatorius" on which the bishop's church listed the books which were not to be read, a list which at any time would have served as an excellent catalogue of the world's best books.

As to loving the master-works of genius, these master-works were so long hidden in the private houses of the wealthy friends of bishops that "the crowd" hardly knew of their existence.

There is no denying that "The multitude live in the senses, not in the soul," and in "contact with material objects."

So much of their time do they spend in "contact with material objects" that they have neither leisure nor energy left for "the life of the soul."

Nor can it be said that when an attempt has been made to remedy this by shortening the hours of labor, that bishops have been distinguished by their enthusiasm in that direction.

So far is the Socialist from belittling the value of the aesthetic, that he prides himself

that the Socialist movement has done more than any other factor to make the workers studious and intellectual. It is precisely because we believe that literature and science should be accessible to all and not confined to either a spiritual or literary priesthood that we labor day and night for a new social order where this opportunity will be universal.

The world is beautiful enough; nature teems with beautiful forms, but to enjoy them we must make their acquaintance. Keats has given us a magnificent description of many of the forms of beauty which are always available for the enrichment of our lives had we but leisure and opportunity.

The following is the opening passage of "Endymion":

"A thing of beauty is a joy forever:
Its loveliness increases; it will never
Pass into nothingness; but still will keep
A bower quiet for us, and a sleep
Full of sweet dreams, and health, and quiet breathing.
Therefore, on every morrow, are we wreathing
A flowery band to bind us to the earth,
Spite of despondence, of the inhuman dearth
Of noble natures, of the gloomy days,
Of all the unhealthy and o'er darkened ways
Made for our searching; yes, in spite of all,
Some shape of beauty moves away the pall
From our dark spirits. Such the sun, the moon,
Trees old and young, sprouting a shady boon
For simple sheep; and such are daffodils
With the green world they live in; and clear rills
That for themselves a cooling covert make

'Gainst the hot season; the mid-forest brake,
Rich with a sprinkling of fair muskrose blooms;
And such, too, is the grandeur of the dooms
We have imagined for the mighty dead;
All lovely tales that we have heard or read:
An endless fountain of immortal drink,
Pouring unto us from the heaven's brink.

Beautiful, yes, and the lines themselves are an example of the beauty which the poet lauds. But it is all a mockery to the millions who are chained to the grinding, unresting car of capital. What know they of "the daffodils" or "the green world they live in?" What "lovely tales" have they either "heard or read?"

When the section hand, or the ironworker has finished his day's work all he is fit for, as Lafargue puts it, is "to swallow his bowl of soup and sink into a deep sleep."

The enjoyment of poetry and beauty needs a material foundation. The wolf of hunger must not be snarling at the door if we are to have that serenity of spirit which the good bishop finds so deplorably lacking in the moiling crowd.

Perchance the reason why the bishop and his kind have all these admirable qualities to themselves is that they are under no necessity to toil or toil at all, so that their elevating contemplation of the beautiful is not disturbed. Shall we be so thoughtless as to disturb it, even long enough to remind them that if they do

not toil, it is because somebody else does it for them, and that as their unusual powers of meditation are only thus made possible, it is just a little ungrateful to rail at the lack of calm reflection displayed by the uncouth toiling multitude?

Might we also suggest that this multitude does more reflecting than it did and more than bishops wot of, and that one of these days these late-born reflections may find expression in vigorous action and that thereafter the "crowd" will spend more of their time contemplating the beautiful, and bishops will devote some of their energies to useful labor.

It was an evil day that led the Bishop of Peoria to embark on the discussion of problems in political economy. In this field his incapacity is colossal. It probably never dawned on his simple mind that this subject requires for its understanding a special training and that perhaps none but a bishop would render dogmatic verdicts in this domain on the strength of chance scraps of information picked up haphazard in desultory reading.

The friends of Henry George advised him not to meddle with Spencer's evolution philosophy—alas! to no purpose—but nobody seems to have warned Spalding of the spectacle he was about to present to the world; probably

Spalding's friends were as little informed as Spalding himself and therefore not qualified to appear in the role of candid friend.

However this may have been, the bishop proceeded to relieve the monotony of the dismal science in a way that must have provoked the ironical laughter of that court jester of political economy, Professor Mallock.

Here is the bishop's contribution to a definition of capital:

"Capital is not so much the result of labor as of abstinence from consumption, which leaves a surplus of the labor product to be invested in profit-bearing enterprises."

There are almost as many definitions of capital as there are writers on the question, but this by the bishop is in a class of its own. It is, as Wordsworth said of Cromwell, like a star and dwells apart. Because it apes the "classic" economists, Spalding imagines it would have had their common approval.

But his great anxiety to clear capital of any obligation to labor led him to a greater absurdity than is common even among bishops. Capital is not the result of labor. Of course not. A doctrine like that would be more "subversive of civilization" than the capitalists' unscrupulous "adulteration of food." The next iniquitous doctrine would be that capital being

the result of labor, it should belong to the laborer. If the first be granted the rest seems to follow inevitably. At all costs the first step in this fatal process must be denied. Therefore, let it be clearly understood, capital is not the result of labor. No, capital is more (how much more?) the result of "abstinence from consumption."

It may be freely conceded that "abstinence from consumption" of a thing might "preserve" that thing, but nothing short of a divine revelation will ever show how mere abstinence from consumption will ever "make" anything. Abstinence from the consumption of a piece of soap, after it has been made, would do much to prevent its dissolution, but nobody has yet ventured to estimate how many centuries of abstinence from the consumption of soap would be required for the production of a single bar.

In a moment of mental aberration the bishop destroys his own position by telling us the nature of this thing which is transformed into capital by abstinence from the consuming of it. And this Spalding calls "labor product"—and thus in the very same sentence where he says that this "labor product" is not so much "the result of labor." If it is not "the result of labor," how can it be a "labor product?"

This brings us to another question. If capital

owes any part of its origin to abstinence, whose abstinence is it that figures in the case? There are people who argue that if a certain industrious person makes anything which is consumable, the maker is the proper person to determine whether its consumption shall be accomplished or abstained from. If this reasoning is sound, as it certainly appears to be, then whatever abstinence there is in the case is the abstinence of the laborer who created the article which is saved from consumption.

Inasmuch as in actual fact capital does not belong to the person or class of persons whose labor produced it, we see no reason for giving up that penetrating definition of capital which describes it as "unpaid labor."

The bishop has another definition—"stored-up ability."

"Capital itself, which makes our great undertakings feasible, is largely stored ability—ability embodied and made permanently fruitful in the means of production and distribution. Columbus did not sail his ships, but had it not been for his genius they would not have sailed at all; and had the mutinous crew thrown him overboard, they would have drifted to death and the New World had not been discovered."

Again: "If labor is not directed by ability it is sterile. The notion that those who work

with the hands are the sole producers of wealth is a fallacy which should deceive no one. The vast increase of wealth in the modern world of industry and commerce is the result to a far greater degree of ability than of labor. It has been produced chiefly by the comparatively few men of exceptional gifts."

Thinkers of Spalding's type are satisfied to stop short at the man of genius, without asking not only what he did for society, but also what society did for him. If we consent to leave this important consideration out of the question the bishop's case is still much too weak to stand on its own legs.

His basic assumption is that the capitalists who are enriched by modern production, and the "comparatively few men of exceptional gifts" who have made modern production, according to his view, are one and the same set of persons.

This assumption is hopelessly untrue. As Lester F. Ward has well said in this connection:

"The whole history of the world shows that those who have achieved have received no reward. The rewards of achievement have fallen to those who achieved nothing."

Spalding's statement is plausible enough when he says:

"The great advances of mankind, in what-

ever sphere, have been made through the genius and under the leadership of a few highly endowed individuals—the prophets of better things, the subduers of the foes of man, the pioneers of progress.”

Of course everybody knows that Herbert Spencer shattered this great man theory years ago. But the bishop’s case is so very weak that even the concession of this important point does not help him.

The bishop is still under the delusion that the capitalist is, and must remain, necessary to the successful production of wealth. Labor is the hand, capital is the brain that directs it.

“Nothing,” says he, “is more wonderful than the hand, but its almost miraculous power is due to the fact that it is the instrument of the brain.”

Whatever element of truth this argument once contained has now disappeared, except in those rapidly diminishing fields where the small production of seventy years ago still survives. The bishop’s argument had some force when the capitalist was a useful factor in the process of production.

What Spalding cannot see is, that industrial evolution has rendered the capitalist unnecessary, thereby destroying the ground of the argument and thereby also the argument itself.

To take a familiar case: The Krupp steel mills in Essen owe a great deal to the ability of Herr Krupp. While they were being built up and established Krupp was an essential factor, and any talk about the capitalist being a useless parasite, not being true, would have failed to carry conviction.

Now Krupp is dead. Yet the steel mills go on as though nothing had happened. Other ability now directs them. But it is not the ability of the capitalist, but the ability of paid servants. The capitalist in the case is a school girl, Bertha Krupp, who knows nothing about the production of steel or the administration of that industry. Her father, as capitalist, represented one stage of capitalist development—the stage when the capitalist was useful and the case for socialism existed only potentially. She represents that later stage where the capitalist function is one of pure appropriation—pure parasitism, and the socialist argument for his abolition stands invincible. Evolution brought him, evolution used him, now evolution renders him useless and prepares to take him away. Blessed be Evolution!

VI.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THOMAS PAINE.

"Patriotism," said the first and greatest of all lexicographers, Samuel Johnson, "is the last refuge of scoundrels." Whatever may have been the precise sense in which Johnson wished to be understood, it is indisputable that patriotism has had for one of its chief functions the cloaking of some of the choicest groups of buccaneers that have figured in history.

British rule in India is one long story of crime in which the criminals were supplied by the traders and aristocrats of England. So freely have they plundered, on various pretexts, the helpless people of that immense dependency that it is now, and has been for years, in a condition of chronic bankruptcy. The East India Company, which began the business, was nothing but a gang of chartered pirates. Its owners and beneficiaries in England gave their agents in India a free hand to extort money in any way they pleased, the only

condition of their further employment being that somehow a certain sum should be shipped to England in time for the periodic distribution of plunder. When a few sentimental Englishmen joined in protest with a great body of would-have-been marauders, who by some oversight had been left off the catalogue of thieves, the one answer was—an appeal to the patriotism of the British public.

Lord Clive, one of the first and ablest extortionists employed by the company, practiced wholesale robbery to meet their ravenous demands, until it became second nature. So much so, in fact that he saw no harm in stealing a few lacs of rupees for his own use. When he returned to England and was tried for his misdemeanors, so brazen had he become that he openly expressed great astonishment that he purloined so little where his opportunities had been so great, and his modesty in this respect, coupled with patriotism, was the main ground of his defense.

It should be noted, as an illustration of the Socialist philosophy, that the British government of India became necessary by reason of the economic exploitation of India by the English. It will unravel many a tangled skein in history if we remember that these two things cannot long exist separately.

Achille Loria wrote his book to show, what Marx had already proven, that any class which appropriates a nation's revenue must, if its appropriation is to continue, also control its government.

British activity in South Africa tells the same story. The one vital question involved in the Boer war with England was who should exploit the wage workers employed in the gold mines of the Rand and the diamond fields of Kimberly. On both sides this fundamental issue was covered with the sacred halo of patriotism and country. Otherwise "Tommy Atkins" would hardly have been so eager to make himself a target for the sharpshooters generaled by Joubert and De Wet. It was not the struggle of a free people against a European despotism, as the pro-Boer imagined; nor was it a noble effort to free the Outlanders from the unjust disabilities imposed on them by the governments of the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State. These were the excuses, not the reasons. The real question was should the surplus value produced in these dominions be appropriated by Paul Kruger et al., or Cecil Rhodes, Barney Barnato and company? Both parties understood thoroughly that whoever took the surplus value must have the government.

The simple-minded American patriot will offer no resistance to these conclusions as derived from these instances, but when it is proposed to apply the same principles of historical interpretation to the history of the United States, it is a very different matter. His magnanimous mind is properly steeled against the perception of any connection between the Cuban war and Cuba's sugar and tobacco plantations. As he sees it, there would have been a Cuban war if Cuba had been nothing but a piece of pasture land or a useless marsh. You cannot tell him that the brave men who shouldered guns and went to Cuba and surrendered their lives to Spanish bullets and Armour's beef were sacrificed to the economic interests of the Havemeyers of the sugar trust and the magnates of the tobacco corporation. He knows that they fought for "Old Glory" and "humanity" and the liberation of a struggling people from a cursed Spanish despotism. He understands all about it; the only thing he does not understand is why the emancipated Cubans do not show more gratitude.

No part of American history has been so completely buried beneath a mish-mash of patriotism and humbug as the revolution of 1776.

Even the vaudeville patriot, who strains his larynx when the familiar picture is thrown

upon the screen, might be supposed to wonder, when he wonders about anything, why this country has never again produced such a band of angel-heroes as suddenly sprang up at that time and contributed their disinterested services to the resuscitation of a perishing country.

A very superficial examination of the annals of this period will reveal evidence enough to show that, even according to orthodox historians, the "fathers of their country" were a rather select circle of smugglers and land thieves.

The restrictions of trade placed upon the American capitalist, who controlled the imperial government, were about as irksome and unbearable as those inflicted on the French capitalist by the French feudal regime. All commerce had to be carried on in ships built in England. American capitalists were not allowed to manufacture anything that could be manufactured in England. Sugar, tobacco, cotton, wool, indigo, ginger, dyeing goods, could be sold to one customer only—England. All imported goods must be bought from England and carried in English ships. Provinces were not allowed to sell woollen goods, hats or iron-ware, even to one another—only to England.

In Maine all trees over two feet in diameter had to be saved for the royal navy.

It is no wonder that such restraints bred revolutionary sentiments among American capitalists, who believed with great fervency in the equal rights of all capitalists to exploit labor and accumulate profits. They were prepared, if an appropriate occasion offered, to maintain that in the matter of exploiting American labor the American capitalist should have preference above all others, English included.

Beneath all the glamour of Fourth of July celebrations and the gushing rhetoric of third-reader oratory, this is the economic, the material, the real origin of the American revolution of 1776.

Two years before the revolution broke out a visitor arrived from England. He came by the advice of Benjamin Franklin, whom he had met in London, where Franklin was then acting as ambassador to the British government from one of her North American provinces. When he arrived in Philadelphia he was thirty-seven years of age. He had begun to work for wages at thirteen at ship-stay making, his father's trade, and later had been an employee of the government in the excise department. It was his experiences during this period that led him to the conclusion, very unusual in his

day, that liberty would never be complete so long as men worked for wages. Two years before he left England he had given the British parliament a sample of his trouble-making powers by writing a pamphlet on the desirability of raising the wages of the most poorly paid employes of the government. This was his first literary effort and was presented to that august body along with a petition from the said employes, asking that its excellent suggestions be put into effect.

Soon after his arrival he became editor of the *Pennsylvania Magazine*, at a salary of \$125 a year. His ability greatly increased the circulation of the magazine and made him many friends among prominent Americans.

Up to this time he had no taste for politics; he had intended to begin a ladies' school when he left England, but things were moving rapidly in America, and his magazine brought him into close contact with the unrest of the time. This man's name was Thomas Paine.

England decided to raise money in America for the army and navy by levying stamp duties. These stamps were to be used on all business documents, such as contracts, etc., or said documents would not be recognized at law. This was purely a business men's and merchants' affair, as workingmen never saw

either the documents or the stamps and were in no way interested in either the one or the other. But the parties who were interested made a great noise, and, what was more to the point, refused to buy the stamps, and the government, finding the act a dead letter, repealed it—but not until a good deal of excitement had been stirred up about it.

England's policy of compelling the colonials to buy from her only, and then putting a big tariff on everything, made smuggling a very profitable and prosperous trade, and one-fourth of the men who signed the Declaration of Independence were well known to be engaged in it.

The lower orders, as the working class was then styled, very rarely tasted such a luxury as tea, but the "better element" in society consumed great quantities of it, and as they could get it cheaper from the highly respectable smugglers than from the government, which had a duty to exact, they patronized the smugglers and all went well. In fact, the government tax on tea was rather a good thing, for it kept the government tea off the market and thus left all the business to the smugglers, and at the same time enabled them to get good prices. If the government tariff had been still higher these gentlemen would have been still better pleased.

But during this time the East India Company, which handled the legitimate tea business, had accumulated seventeen million pounds of unsalable tea in its warehouses, and there were still other cargoes lying in Boston harbor. The company, in order to dispose of this immense stock before it spoiled, persuaded the government to remit the tax. When this was done the tea in Boston harbor was cheaper to the consumer than the tea offered by the smugglers. Thereupon the smugglers arose in patriotic wrath and dumped the goods of their undercutting competitor into the bay. This was the performance which has been presented to the mind of the American schoolboy as an act of exalted patriotic devotion.

At the opening of the year of the revolution all was confusion. The struggle had begun at Lexington and Concord. The short-sighted, narrow-visioned petty traders, smugglers, and land thieves, were wholly unable to see beyond the ends of their noses and had not the remotest idea as to what should be done.

There was one man in America who had grasped the tendencies of the time and was able to measure the significance of events. That was the recent emigrant who was editing the Pennsylvania Magazine. On the first

day of January of the year 1776, from which the revolution is dated, this man published a forty-page pamphlet which had much the same effect as a spark dropped in a powder magazine. He openly advocated in this pamphlet, which he called "Common Sense," what nobody else had dared to openly mention—a complete separation from the British government and the establishment by the colonists of a government of their own. In "Common Sense" Paine said: "I challenge the warmest advocate of reconciliation to show a single advantage that this continent can reap by being connected with Great Britain; I repeat the challenge—not a single advantage is derived." He produced a vast army of arguments for separation, among which was the following: "Even the distance at which the Almighty has placed England and America is a strong, natural proof that the authority of the one over the other was never the design of heaven."

"Common Sense" took away the breath of the vacillating smugglers, who were afraid they might be involved in the terrible crime of treason to the king, or rebellion against the government. On the very day that "Common Sense" appeared, the king's speech arrived from England, and it read as if every line had been written to justify "Common Sense." The

pamphlet had an immediate circulation of a hundred thousand; everybody who could read, read it. The New York assembly appointed a committee to reply to it, but they separated with the report that it was unanswerable. Paine might have made a small fortune out of it, but instead he gave the right of publication to every publisher who wished to use it, with the result that he was left with nothing but a printer's bill for \$146.

Paine combined two qualities that rarely meet in one man. A man of thought, he was also a man of action. In this first year of the revolution he joined Washington's army and marched in the ranks. Sitting by campfires he wrote that remarkable series of articles called "The Crisis," beginning with the sentence which became a watchword of the revolution, and is now an integral part of our language: "These are the times that try men's souls."

When Washington's troops were starving and discouraged he raised their drooping spirits by having passages read to them from Paine's writings.

When the war threatened to break down for want of funds he began a private subscription list, heading it with \$500, all the money he could raise. This act so stimulated others

that it brought a total of a million and a half. Then he went to France with Colonel Laurens and succeeded in securing from the French a gift of a million and a quarter dollars and a loan of two millions.

Such was the man whose name is suppressed by historians who were not fit to tie his shoestrings. It will always remain a stain on the escutcheon of John Fiske that in his school history of America he merely mentions as a signer of the declaration of independence and the author of "Common Sense," this magnanimous man, one of the most illustrious emigrants who ever came to these shores. McMaster in the text book for pupils does not even mention his name.

All revolutions, like all social movements, have two relations. They have a narrow and specific relation to the needs and circumstances of their day, and they have a wider relation to the broader sweep of history, the general progress of the race. They somewhat resemble the earth, which has two motions—one by which it turns on its own axis, and the other by which it moves along its orbit. Most of the actors in any revolution so far accomplished have had the narrower vision which enabled them to perceive only the immediate gain. Of this class were the "fathers of their

country," the mercantile and mercenary nature of whose motives stood out plainly in all their acts. No Socialist, of course, will condemn their smuggling or other rebellious acts as being morally wrong. It was a case of "diamond cut diamond," or, to be more accurate, "dog eat dog." But it is well to remind the present defenders of capitalist extortion, whose faces lengthen with horror at the very mention of any form of revolt, of the revolutionary and treasonable behavior of their class ancestors when somebody else turned on the screws.

Every revolution, however, has attracted men who had no personal concern in the immediate economic advantages which the revolution sought to obtain. These men were imbued with lofty and sublime ideals in the pursuit of which they willingly faced poverty and even death. In the difference between these motives many Socialists have seen the grounds for an extensive controversy, but the supposed contradiction has no real existence. The parties to the discussion who have sought to prove that all men are moved by their own immediate interests have presented a ridiculous misinterpretation of the Socialist philosophy. As Labriola well said, "Only an idiot could believe that the individual morality of

each one is proportionate to his individual economic situation." Again he says: "No one lives so shut up in his own class that he does not undergo the influence of the other classes, of the common environment and the interlacing traditions, it is never possible to reduce the development of each individual to the abstract and general type of his class and social status. This is why men in a lower class often fight the battles of a class above them, and men from a class above link their fortunes with a class below. What all these motives have in common, and what unifies them and destroys the apparent dualism is that they all originate in the material facts and economic conditions of the time."

It has been left for Socialist thinkers to recognize and appreciate the wonderful power of the human mind to idealize so-called sordid things. The mind hath an alchemy by which it receives the impress of the aspirations of a social group and reproduces them as the highest goal of the human race. And this apparently fanciful and fantastic result has very solid foundations in the constitution of things. In every revolution, where two sides struggle for victory, one represents the past and is therefore reactionary, while the other incarnates the future and is progressive. Both sides

will attract supporters from all sections of society, though not in the same proportion as from the group whose immediate interests are to be served.

It was undoubtedly the idealization of the aspirations of the American bourgeoisie for the right to politically govern and economically exploit American labor as against the reactionary aims of the English capitalists to do so abnormally from a distance, that actuated Thomas Paine. Not the actual, half-conscious aspiration itself, but that idealization of it which presented it as the effort of society to take another step forward. Paine's writings show that he saw the conflict of interests between the merchants of both countries, but he did not understand its full significance. This conflict did not appear to him as the dynamic force of the revolution. What impressed him most was the struggle between the principle of monarchy and the principles of republicanism. Here again Paine was right, though only secondarily and not primarily, as he imagined. The monarchy was the appropriate political form for a feudal society. "The great land owner stands today," says Kautsky, "for a strong and preferably monarchical form of government, because as a part of the nobility he can personally influence the monarch through

them, and through him the governmental power," while of the industrial capitalist he says: "His interests demand rather a strong parliament than a strong government."

Capitalism is better served by a republican form of government than any other, and when any feudal nation adopts the capitalist mode of production, one of the first changes in the political superstructure which is seen to arise from that change in the economic base, is a change, or series of changes, leading from absolute monarchy in the direction of republicanism. In Russia it is a douma; in Japan it is a constitution. Among the bourgeois nations the monarch is abolished or reduced to a national toy.

In his estimate of the French revolution, which broke out thirteen years later, Paine made the same mistake. It was not to him a struggle between a ruling class and one seeking to rule, but a life-and-death battle between the monarchy and the people. Any criticism of Paine in this connection should duly regard the time in which he wrote, which was more than half a century before this principle of historical interpretation had been discovered, and we have no more right to expect to find it in his works than to expect a description of an automobile or a phonograph.

That which has won for Paine a more discerning admiration than has ever been accorded to Washington and Hancock and that group, is that he had no such immediate ends to serve as are now conspicuous in their cases. Simons has proved, in his "Class Struggles in America," by a galaxy of accepted authorities, that Washington had entangled himself rather badly with the government in respect to a certain thirty thousand acres of land which he had illegally surveyed. Hancock came to trial in the Admiralty court at Boston and was involved in penalties for smuggling which totaled half a million dollars. Fortunately for Hancock, the very day he was brought to trial the revolutionary war broke out at Lexington and his case had to be shelved. The revolutionary enthusiasm of these gentlemen is not at all obscure as to its source and mainsprings—whatever other sources it may have had. Thomas Paine compares with these men about as Robert Owen compares with the landlords who aided in factory reform. They were getting even with the capitalist manufacturers who had injured them by land legislation, while Owen was himself a factory owner and had his own profits reduced every time his projects succeeded.

The main cause of Paine's unpopularity is

undoubtedly to be found in his attitude toward the Christian religion. He saw the church and the king everywhere in league and he believed if both could be abolished the race would be redeemed. Most of his friendly biographers and pronounced partisans still think that the only reason why liberty did not come with the overthrow of the monarchy is that priestcraft was left standing. Says biographer Blanchard: "Had Thomas Paine been seconded as valiantly when he made priestcraft howl, as when he hurled defiance against kings, despotism by this time would really, instead of only nominally, have lain as low as did its minions at Trenton and Yorktown."

It is this essential blindness as to the real cause of the enslavement of the worker, which is responsible for the bankruptcy of modern liberalism. The freethinker who is nothing more than a freethinker, cannot see that in its role of distorting and misleading the brain of the worker the church is outdone a hundred times by the non-religious capitalist press.

Roosevelt's vulgar fling at Paine in his "Life of Gouverneur Morris," on page 289, of which he calls Paine a "filthy, little atheist," involves an error, which, considering the easy accessibility of Paine's works, deserves to be characterized by a "shorter and uglier word." Paine

argued against atheism at great length, and in defense of his belief in one god—deism. In an address delivered in Paris before a society of deists, he presented with great care and detail the argument from first cause and the argument from design, both of which were considered quite formidable in pre-Darwinian days.

If ever a man had a good excuse for believing in divine providence it was Paine. When he sat in the national assembly, during the French revolution, as representative of Calais, he opposed the execution of the king. He said: "Let us destroy the principle of monarchy, but take no human life." As a consequence, he fell under the suspicion of the extremists, and during the "reign of terror" he was thrown into jail. Every day a list of those who were to be executed next morning was made up, and a guard made the rounds of the prison, marking the doors of the cells occupied by those named on the list. At last Paine's name appeared on the fatal catalogue, but when the guard marked his cell door, he failed to notice that it was open back to the wall. Next morning, when the company of soldiers came to round up that day's harvest for the guillotine, Paine's door being closed, the fatal mark was on the "inside." This, and

the state of science in his day, is quite enough to account for Paine's deism. Nothing can be produced that will justify his being described as an atheist.

Of his "Age of Reason" it is enough to say here that a hundred years after it was written most of its main conclusions were accepted by that important and highly respectable body of church scholars called the higher critics.

Thomas Paine was the stormy petrel of two of the greatest revolutions in history. He contributed heavily to the literature of both and stood ready at all times to defend them against criticism and disparagement. When the Abbe Raney inveighed against the American revolution, he published a crushing reply, and when Burke attacked the French revolution Paine responded with "The Rights of Man," which, while it shows the limitations of his age, is a masterpiece of forensic skill, and contains arguments which will never be shaken.

When Paine had done all that a man could in the American struggle for independence, and could have retired, leaving a name entitled to a foremost place in the annals of his kind, the revolution broke out in France and he at once embarked to that country and began, with unabated vigor, to assist at another revolutionary birth. If, when France had a dis-

mantled feudalism, some other country had needed his aid in such a struggle, it is practically certain that Paine would have hurried to the scene. If Paine could have known that the final deliverance of the race meant another gigantic world struggle in the future, he would have longed to be alive in that day and do a brave man's part. Paine's ambition was not so much to enjoy the fruits of liberty as to toil for its achievement.

Benjamin Franklin said: "Where liberty is, there is my country," to which Paine made a magnificent and characteristic reply: "Where liberty is not, there is my country."

A Socialist may well pause and ask, which is the greater part: to be born in a co-operative commonwealth, where human liberty is an accomplished fact, or be alive today when true men and true women join hand with hand and brain with brain, and fight unflinchingly the cause of generations yet unborn? And when we remember the tens of thousands who cannot fight or even protest, who are crushed without a cry, who are slaughtered like sheep in the shambles, we hear the imperious call of class and kind, and bend again to the task before us—the dissipation of the night, the in-bringing of the day.

VII.

ENGELS' REPLY TO DUEHRING.

For some time previous to the year 1875 the German Socialist party had been divided into two camps—the Eisenachers and the Lassallians. About that time they closed their ranks and presented to the common enemy a united front. So great was their increase of strength from that union that they were determined never to divide again. They would preserve their newly won unity at all costs.

No sooner was this decision made than it seemed as if it was destined to be overthrown. Prof. Eugene Dühring, Privat Docent of Berlin University, loudly proclaimed himself a convert to Socialism. When this great figure from the bourgeois intellectual world stepped boldly and somewhat noisily into the arena, there was not wanting a considerable group of young and uninitiated members in the party who flocked to his standard and found in him a new oracle.

This would have been well enough if Dühring had been content to take Socialism as he

found it or if he had been well enough informed to make an intelligent criticism of it and reveal any mistakes in its positions. But he was neither the one nor the other. He undertook, without the slightest real qualification for the task, to overthrow Marx and establish a new Socialism which should be free from the lamentable blunders of the Marxian school.

Marx was a mere bungler and the whole matter must be set right without delay. This was rather a large task but the Professor went at it in a large way. He did it in the approved German manner. Germany would be forever disgraced if any philosopher took up a new position about anything without going back to the first beginnings of the orderly universe in nebulous matter, and showing that from that time on to the discovery of the latest design in tin kettles everything that happened simply went to prove his new theory.

Dühring presented a long suffering world with three volumes that were at least large enough to fill the supposed aching void. These were: "A Course of Philosophy," "A Course of Political and Social Science" and "A Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism."

These large volumes gave Dühring quite a standing among ill-informed Socialists, who took long words for learning, and obscurity for

profundity. His followers became so numerous that a new division of the ranks threatened and it became clear that Dühring's large literary output must be answered.

There was a man in the Socialist movement at that time who was pre-eminently fitted for that task, who for over thirty years had proven himself a master of discussion and an accomplished scholar—Frederick Engels.

Engels' friends urged him to rid the movement of this new intellectual incubus. Engels pleaded he was already over busy with those tasks which show him to have been so patient and prolific a worker. Finally, realizing the importance of the case, he yielded.

Dühring had wandered all over the universe to establish his philosophy, and in his reply Engels would have to follow him. So far from this deterring Engels, it was just this which made the task attractive. He says in his preface of 1892:

"I had to treat of all and every possible subject, from the concepts of time and space to Bimetallism; from the eternity of matter and motion to the perishable nature of moral ideas; from Darwin's natural selection to the education of youth in a future society. Anyhow, the systematic comprehensiveness of my opponent

gave me the opportunity of developing, in opposition to him, and in a more connected form than had previously been done, the views held by Marx and myself on this great variety of subjects. And that was the principal reason which made me undertake this otherwise ungrateful task."

Dealing with the same point, in his biographical essay on Engels, Kautsky says:

"Dühring was a many-sided man. He wrote on Mathematics and Mechanics, as well as on Philosophy and Political Economy, Jurisprudence, Ancient History, etc. Into all these spheres he was followed by Engels, who was as many-sided as Dühring, but in another way. Engels' many-sidedness was united with a fundamental thoroughness which in these days of specialization is found only in a few cases and was rare even at that time. * * * It is to the superficial many-sidedness of Dühring that we owe the fact that the 'Anti-Dühring' became a book which treated the whole of modern science from the Marx-Engels materialistic point of view. Next to 'Capital' the 'Anti-Dühring' has become the fundamental work of modern Socialism."

Engels' reply was published in the Leipsic "Vorwärts," in a series of articles beginning

early in 1877, and afterwards in a volume entitled, "Mr. Dühring's Revolution in Science." This book came to be known by its universal and popular title: "Anti-Dühring."

After the appearance of this book Dühring's influence disappeared. Instead of a great leader in Socialism, Dühring found himself regarded as a museum curiosity, so much so that Kautsky, writing in 1887, said:

"The occasion for the 'Anti-Dühring' has been long forgotten. Not only is Dühring a thing of the past for the Social Democracy, but the whole throng of academic and platonic Socialists have been frightened away by the anti-Socialist legislation, which at least had the one good effect to show where the reliable supports of our movement are to be found."

Out of Anti-Dühring came the most important Socialist pamphlet ever published, unless, perhaps, we should except "The Communist Manifesto," though even this is by no means certain. In 1892 Engels related the story of its birth:

"At the request of my friend, Paul Lafargue, now representative of Lille in the French Chamber of Deputies, I arranged three chapters of this book as a pamphlet, which he translated and published in 1880, under the title:

"Socialism, Utopian and Scientific." From this French text a Polish and a Spanish edition were prepared. In 1883, our German friends brought out the pamphlet in the original language. Italian, Russian, Danish, Dutch, and Roumanian translations, based upon the German text, have since been published. Thus, with the present English edition, this little book circulates in ten languages. I am not aware that any other Socialist work, not even our "Communist Manifesto" of 1848 or Marx's "Capital," has been so often translated. In Germany it has had four editions of about 20,000 copies in all."

The man who has the good fortune to become familiar with the contents of this pamphlet in early life will never, in after life, be able to estimate its full value as a factor in his intellectual development. I have persuaded thousands in my audiences to buy it and have invariably given them this advice: "Keep it in your coat pocket by day and under your pillow by night, and read it again and again until you know it almost by heart."

One day, during the time I was delivering course lectures in the San Francisco Academy of Sciences, under the auspices of Local San Francisco of the Socialist Party some five years

ago, I paid a visit to the law offices of a well-known American Socialist lecturer and author, Austin Lewis. The conversation drifted to Anti-Dühring and I expressed my lamentations that English readers could not get a full translation of so indispensable and invaluable a work. To my delight and astonishment he pulled out a drawer in one of his desks, and pointing to a package in the corner, said: "There is the English manuscript and before very long it will be in the hands of the Chicago publishers, Chas. H. Kerr & Co."

That volume has since made its appearance at a modest dollar and should adorn the bookshelf of every Socialist in the English-speaking world. Since, however, the larger volume does not, as I think unfortunately, reproduce the remarkable preface written for the pamphlet in 1892, nor the valuable third chapter of the pamphlet, "Socialism, Utopian and Scientific" remains indispensable and should have a place on the shelf with the larger volume of which it is really an integral part.

If new converts to Socialism could only be persuaded to read Engels before they try their strength on Marx they would be saved great mental distress and much unnecessary discouragement.

As Kautsky puts it: "Most of our friends, as soon as they recognize that socialism is not a matter of sympathy but of science, at once throw themselves with fiery energy upon Capital, break out their teeth on the theory of value, and then drop everything. The result would be entirely different if they first took up Engels' pamphlets, and only after they had thoroughly studied these betook themselves to "Capital."

The most important part of this controversy is that which deals with questions of philosophy, and especially the chapter on the Marxian Dialectic. As this is enough, and more than enough, for one lecture we shall leave it for separate treatment in the next lecture and confine ourselves here to the above account of the origin and importance of the discussion, and to some special phases of it which we shall now proceed to consider:

One of the many fields into which Dühring went for material out of which to build his new philosophy was the important one of biology. In biology Dühring's pet aversion was Darwinism. When we remember that this was sixteen years after the publication of the "Origin of Species," when Darwinism, in its main contentions, had won its battles in the scientific

world, we begin to realize that Dühring was as backward in natural science as he was everywhere else.

Among students of the question it is well known that Darwinism and Evolution are by no means identical, although that notion has great prevalence in the public mind and is responsible for much confusion.

The Darwinian theory of "selection" which undertakes to explain the method of evolution, and evolution itself, are two different things, and even if Darwinism itself—the selection theory—should be utterly annihilated, the theory of Evolution would remain untouched. The theory of Descent, as evolution is called in biology, stands today as it stood long before Dühring wrote his book, invulnerable.

Dühring not only rejected the specific theories of Darwin but he was very skeptical about evolution, so much so that he objected to the use of the word. Of course it is clear enough that if evolution could be demolished, the Marxian Socialist philosophy would lack the stability of a house of cards.

Strangely enough one of Dühring's chief objections to Darwin is not an objection to Darwin at all, but to Malthus. He complains that Darwin borrowed an idea from Malthus and

then, instead of showing where Darwin went wrong, he begins to rail at the Malthusian ideas of limiting the increase of population.

We may readily concede that the Malthusian theory of the struggle for existence as he applied it in human society, was false and deserved to be ridiculed. But this in no way discredits Darwin. A theory may be true in one field and false in another. And this was the case here. The same theory which was false in its Malthusian use was true in its Darwinian application.

Speaking of Darwin, Engels says:

"These causes (of changes in animals) he found in the disproportion between the enormous number of germs made by nature and the small number of beings which actually come to maturity. But as the germ struggles for its own development there is of necessity a consequent struggle for existence, which not only shows itself directly in the wear and tear of the body, but also as a struggle for space and light, as in the case of plants. And it is evident that in this fight those individuals have the best prospect of coming to maturity and reproducing themselves which possess certain qualities, perhaps insignificant, but advantageous in their fight for existence."

Darwin was right; if among the lower animals more mouths are born than there is food for, some must die for want of food. But this is not necessarily true among human beings where Malthus sought to prove it, and the reason is plain; man is able by artificial means—agriculture and industry—to increase his food supply to meet the needs of an increased population. Every human being born into human society means not only a mouth to feed but also a pair of hands and a brain that will be easily able to produce the food without increasing the burdens of society.

This one fact was fatal to all the reasoning of Malthus. But as this is not the case among animals where the food supply has no tendency to accommodate itself to an increased population, the struggle for existence is inevitable and brings with it, of course, its concomitant, the survival of the fittest. I have gone over this ground in my chapter on Darwinism in "Evolution Social and Organic."

Dühring then proceeds to define the struggle for existence after a fashion of his own and after having produced a definition Darwin would have at once repudiated, he begins to reproach Darwin for it, as though Darwin were responsible.

Dühring says: "In a sufficiently accurate sense the struggle for existence only occurs within the sphere of brutality, in so far as nourishment depends upon robbery and consumption." And having himself reduced the Darwinian idea to this narrow concept of brutality, he rails at Darwin and against the theory of struggle because, he asserts, it is brutal.

This reminds us somewhat of the controversial methods employed by Gladstone against Huxley in their famous controversy.

Mr. Gladstone had asserted as "a demonstrated conclusion and established fact" that the order of the appearance of animal life according to Genesis is the same as "is understood to have been affirmed in our own time by natural science."

To which Huxley replied: "Understood? By whom?" According to Gladstone's interpretation of Genesis the "air population" of birds was created on the fifth day and the "land population" of animals and creeping things on the sixth.

Huxley pointed out that this was so far from being the order "affirmed in our time by natural science" that it was the precise opposite, inasmuch as birds—air population—evolved from reptiles—land population.

When Gladstone saw his elaborate argument hopelessly ruined by the reptiles, instead of answering Huxley he began to heap his wrath upon those unfortunate creatures. He called them all manner of evil names, "a family fallen from greatness" and "mere skulkers of the earth." He represented them as wholly contemptible and altogether beneath notice.

To which Huxley calmly replied: "Still the wretched creatures stand there importunately demanding notice. * * * However reprehensible and indeed contemptible, terrestrial reptiles may be, the only question which appears to me to be relevant to my argument is whether or not these creatures are or are not comprised under the denomination of "everything that creepeth upon the ground."

So with Dühring, the question is not whether the struggle for existence is or is not brutal, but whether it is a fact and if so does it play the part ascribed to it by Darwin? On these points Dühring is dumb. In all his objections to Darwinism nothing escapes him on the real question at issue.

Dühring dare not wholly deny the struggle for existence. It has never been wholly denied by anybody of repute. Even Kropotkin, who has labored more than anyone to modify it by

his theory of "mutual aid" admits it as a main factor in the evolutionary process.

So Dühring retreats under cover of his favorite pretext—he will settle the whole difficulty by changing the name. Instead of saying "struggle for existence" we must henceforth say "lack of the conditions of existence, and lack of mechanical realization." And, for this ingenious philosopher, there the matter ends.

Dühring argues that Darwin's theory collapses because Darwin derives all life from a single original vegetable form. To this Engels replies:

"The statement that Darwin traced all existing organisms from one original germ is, to put it politely, a piece of pure imagination on the part of Herr Dühring."

Of course Darwin held, as everybody holds now, that related forms have a common ancestry. All pigeons are descended from the wild rock pigeon. All horses from a five-toed ancestor about eighteen inches high, who lived in the tertiary rocks and was also the parent of the ass and the zebra. All dogs are descended from an ancestor, who was a close relation of the wolf, and a little further back dog and wolf merge in a common stock. All known

chickens are the progeny of the jungle bird which is still cackling in the jungles of India.

But this tendency is not peculiarly Darwinian. Darwin only held this view in common with all the evolutionists and it is part of the general theory of descent which nothing can ever shake. Haeckel has gone further in this direction than Darwin, and modern science in general has gone much further than the great but cautious Englishman.

Again, Dühring objects that "Darwinism produces its changes and variations out of nothing."

This difficulty is wholly due to his ignorance of Darwin's teachings. Darwin was always careful to explain that he did not know the causes of variation. He only claimed that variation is a fact—which cannot be refuted. Then, given that animals do vary from their ancestors and parents, and Darwin's theory is that those organisms which vary in the direction of greater adaptation to their environment will survive in the struggle for existence, i. e., they will be "selected" by nature to beget the next generation and perpetuate by heredity the characters which made them successful.

As De Vries put it, natural selection is only a sieve which acts on organisms after they

have changed, and not the cause of the change itself.

This is the real Darwinian theory and it has passed through the fire of criticism and been laid on many deathbeds, but as Darwin himself taught it, it stands today unshaken and unscathed.

Once more Dühring is willing to settle the whole matter by a change of name. The word evolution does not please the professor and so it must go. In its place we must use the word "composition."

"Finally," says Engels, "with a sarcasm of which there is so much in his reply that the translator decided to leave most of it out, "he warns against misuse of the terms metamorphosis and evolution. Metamorphosis, he says, is a very obscure notion, and the concept of evolution is only admissible in so far as a law of evolution can be really proved. Instead of either of these expressions we should employ the term 'composition' and then everything would be all right. It is the same old story Herr Dühring is satisfied if we change the names. If we speak of the evolution of the chicken in the egg we give rise to confusion because we have only an incomplete knowledge of the law of evolution. But if we speak of its 'composition' every-

thing becomes clear. We must therefore say no longer 'this child is growing nicely,' but he composes himself splendidly,' and we congratulate Herr Dühring upon the fact that he is not only a peer of the author of the Niebelungen Ring in his opinion of himself, but in his own particular capacity is also a composer of the future."

We shall make no attempt here to follow Dühring, as Engels has done, through the confused mass of unrelated ideas which the Berlin professor is pleased to call political economy and Socialism.

Dühring cannot accept the theory of Marx that panics are due to "over-production." No, panics are due to "underconsumption." To some, at first sight, this will look like Dühring's old trick of changing the name. But it is much more than this. It is a new, and as Engels shows, an untenable theory. It is the old blunder of trying to account for changing phenomena by an unchanging cause.

Engels' answer disposes of it effectively:

"It is unfortunately true that underconsumption of the masses and the limitation of the expenditures of the great majority to the necessities of life and the reproduction thereof is not by any means a new phenomenon. It has existed as long at the appropriating and the

plundered classes have existed. Even in those historic periods where the condition of the masses was exceptionally prosperous, as in England in the fifteenth century, there was underconsumption; men were very far from having their entire yearly product at their own disposal.

"Although underconsumption has been a constant historical phenomenon for a thousand years, the general breakdown in trade, due to overproduction, has appeared, for the first time, within the last fifteen years. Yet the vulgar political economy of Herr Dühring attempts to explain the new phenomenon, not by means of the new factor of overproduction, but by means of the exceedingly old factor of underconsumption. It is just as if one were to try and explain a change in the relation of two mathematical quantities, one of which is constant and the other variable, not from the fact that the variable quantity has varied, but that the constant has remained constant.

"The underconsumption of the masses is a necessary condition of all forms of society in which robbers and robbed exist, and therefore of the capitalist system. But it is the capitalist system which first brings about the economic crisis. Underconsumption is a pre-

requisite of crises and plays a very conspicuous role in them, but it has no more to do with the economic crisis of the present day than it had with the former absence of such crises."

The question as to what constitutes freedom and how it is related to necessity is full of pitfalls for Dühring. After citing his confused and contradictory notions, Engels develops his own view, taking Hegel as his starting point.

"Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood. Freedom does not consist in an imaginary independence of natural laws, but in a knowledge of these laws and in the possibility thence derived of applying them intelligently to given ends."

"Freedom, therefore," says Engels, "consists in mastery over ourselves and external nature founded upon knowledge of the necessities of nature; it is, therefore, necessarily a product of historical development. The first human beings to become differentiated from the lower animals were in all essentials as devoid of freedom as these animals themselves, but each step in human development was a step toward freedom.

"At the threshold of human history stands the discovery of the transformations of mechanical motion in heat, the generation of fire

by friction; at the close of development up to the present stands the discovery of the transformation of heat into mechanical motion, the steam engine. In spite of the tremendous revolution in the direction of freedom which the steam engine has produced in society it is not yet half complete. There is no question that the production of fire by friction still surpasses it as an agent in the liberation of humanity. because the production of fire by friction for the first time gave man power over the forces of nature and separated him forever from the lower animals.

“The steam engine can never bridge so wide a chasm. It appears, however, as the representative of all those productive forces by the help of which alone a state of society is rendered possible in which no class subjection or pain will be produced by reason of the lack of means for the sustenance of the individual, in which moreover it will be possible to speak of real human freedom as arising from living in accordance with the recognized laws of nature.”

This idea that real civilization consists of our growing knowledge of natural laws and consequent increasing power to make nature do our bidding and instead of being destroyed

or transformed by our cosmic environment, we are able to change that environment to suit our needs; this is the crowning generalization of Lester F. Ward's system of sociology. By the invention of clothes man becomes "free" to live in climates where he would otherwise freeze to death.

But the full freedom of the human race will not be achieved until social laws are also understood. This involves the development in men and women of a social consciousness of the possibility of consciously arranging production and distribution to meet the needs of all. Thus the key to human freedom must be sought in a knowledge of the science of society.

This knowledge is not easily acquired. But it is difficult to see how liberty can be established until it is much more generally diffused, especially among the class which is to benefit most by its results.

The working class will never emancipate itself so long as it is steeped in ignorance, prejudice and superstition. So we must work day and night for the dissemination of this knowledge and wait patiently as we may for the harvest.

Kautsky records the following from a conversation with Engels: "We have learned to

wait,' said Engels to me, 'and you in turn must learn to wait your time.' But by such waiting he did not mean waiting with folded arms and open mouth until one of the roasted doves of spontaneous development should fly down the throat, but a waiting in tireless labor—labor of organization and propaganda. Quietly and decisively, with faith in our own good cause, without either prophecy or hesitancy, we must toil on, without rest, to weld the mass of the proletariat more firmly and clearly together and to fill them with a clearer self consciousness."

And Frederick Engels, after laboring patiently and waiting patiently for over half a century, the hero of a hundred battles, beloved by the proletariat of all countries, with bowed shoulders and whitened hair, at last "approached his grave as one that wraps the draperies of his couch about him and lies down to pleasant dreams."

Among his latest utterances was this hopeful and courageous appeal:

"Above all, let the oppressed close up their ranks and reach out their hands to each other across the boundary lines of every nation. Let the international proletariat develop and organize until the beginning of the new century shall lead it on to victory."

VIII.

ENGELS VS. DUEHRING ON THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC.

The greatest glory of man is undoubtedly his ability to think. Of all the wonderful things that have grown out of the cosmic process, the crowning wonder is the power of thought.

To discover the nature of the thought process, its relation to the thinker and the universe he thinks about, has always been the supreme problem of philosophy. This is what the philosophers call "the problem of thinking and being."

In attempting to unravel these mysteries the philosophers grouped themselves in two opposing camps. One camp contended for materialism, the other for idealism. Side by side with this development there grew up two methods of thinking—the dialectical and metaphysical.

The natural pairing of the position in thought with the mode of thinking is for the materialist to be a dialectician and the idealist to be metaphysical. This is, however, by no

means invariable. The French materialists of the eighteenth century, for example, were metaphysical in their mode of thought, while Hegel, who may be called the modern founder of the dialectic, was an idealist. Nevertheless, there is a clearly recognizable tendency to affiliation between materialism and the dialectic, on the one hand, and idealism and metaphysics on the other. We shall try to find the reason for this underlying relationship.

Marx and Engels both took especial delight in ridiculing the crass stupidity of the English middle class which shuddered at the word materialism. Especially did these philosophers delight in ridiculing the hypocritical pretense that materialism was a foreign importation.

Marx declared modern materialism to begin with Bacon, continue with Hobbes, while the proof of Bacon's position, he says, was supplied by Locke.

John Locke, who is spoken of by Marx as having "supplied the proof" of Bacon's materialism, made a distinct advance on Hobbes his predecessor. Hobbes had maintained that all our ideas had their origin in one source—the senses. Locke added a second source, reflection. Locke said: "Sense and reflection are the source of all our ideas."

"If it shall be demanded," says Locke, "when a man begins to have any ideas, I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the mind are coeval with sensation."

Locke then proceeds to explain the second source of ideas: "In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. These are the impressions which are made on our senses by outward objects that are extrinsical to the mind, and its own operations proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself; which when reflected on by itself, becoming also objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity of the human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects on them. This is the first step that a man makes towards the discovery of and the groundwork whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which

tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their footing here; in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation."

Again says Locke: "When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas (ideas from sensation) it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind not taken in by the ways aforementioned."

When Locke wrote thus in his celebrated "Essay on the Human Understanding," with a simplicity and explicitness far from common among philosophical writers, he anticipated conclusions which modern science has thoroughly established. Locke was one of the most brilliant and penetrating thinkers of his day, and the materialism which he championed Marx transplanted to history, where it became the foundation of a revolutionary philosophy.

Before that could be done, however, materialism had to be freed from the narrow limitations of metaphysical thinking, and established on a dialectic or evolutionary foundation.

The introduction of the dialectical mode of thinking into modern historical philosophy we owe to Hegel. Here again we are heavily indebted to Greece, for as Bacon took his materialism from Anaxagoras and Democritus, so Hegel took his dialectic from Heraclitus. The great saying of Heraclitus: "Nothing is, everything is becoming," is at the center of Hegel's method and enabled Hegel to anticipate the theory of evolution before the biologist had demonstrated it.

The main differences between these two modes of thinking are these: The metaphysician regards the universe as static. He cannot conceive of its interrelations in space nor its history and growth in time. Newton, for example, had a metaphysical concept when he regarded the universe as having been created complete and given the necessary initial start by its creator.

The dialectical thinker, on the contrary, sees things in their growth and movement; he is essentially an evolutionist. He is to the metaphysician what Kant was to Newton when

Kant showed that the universe had not been launched forth fully formed, as Newton supposed, but had slowly evolved from nebulous matter.

There is the same difference between Linnaeus and Darwin in biology; Linnaeus had the metaphysical concept while Darwin did more than any man who ever lived to establish the dialectic.

Linnaeus, whose immortality rests on his classification and naming of plants and animals, placed man among the mammals. This was not because Linnaeus thought they were in any way related or had developed from a common ancestry. All he saw was that they happened to resemble each other. This was before the dialectic had penetrated scientific thinking. It was when science was trembling on the verge of that evolutionary theory which is the triumph of the dialectic.

A characteristic picture of the state of thought at the transition period is given by Haeckel in his "Last Words on Evolution."

Speaking of Johannes Muller Haeckel says:

"I myself had a number of remarkable conversations with Muller, whom I put at the head of all my distinguished teachers, in the summer of 1854. His lectures on comparative anatomy

and physiology—the most illuminating and stimulating I ever heard—had captivated me to such an extent that I asked and obtained his permission to make a closer study of the skeletons and other preparations in his splendid museum of comparative anatomy (then in the right wing of the buildings of the Berlin University), and to draw them. Muller (then in his fifty-fourth year) used to spend the Sunday afternoon alone in the museum. He would walk to and fro for hours in the spacious rooms, his hands behind his back, buried in thought about the mysterious affinities of the vertebrates, the “holy enigma” of which was so forcibly impressed by the row of skeletons. Now and again my great master would turn to a small table at the side, at which I (a student of twenty years) was sitting in the angle of a window, making conscientious drawings of the skulls of mammals, reptiles, amphibians and fishes.

“I would then beg him to explain particularly difficult points in anatomy, and once I ventured to put the question: “Must not all these vertebrates, with their identity in internal skeleton, in spite of their external differences, have come originally from a common form?” The great master nodded his head thoughtfully,

and said: 'Ah, if we only knew that! If ever you solve that riddle, you will have accomplished a supreme work.' Two months afterwards, in September, 1854, I had to accompany Muller to Heligoland, and learned under his direction the beautiful and wonderful inhabitants of the sea. As we fished together in the sea, and caught the lovely medusae, I asked him how it was possible to explain their remarkable alternation of generations; if the medusae, from the ova of which polyps develop today, must not have come originally from the more simply organized polyps? To this precocious question, I received the same resigned answer: 'Ah, that is a very obscure problem! We know nothing whatever about the origin of species.' "

How completely Darwin solved the "Holy enigma" is now common knowledge, and by so doing he drove metaphysical thinking from biology as Hegel had dislodged it from history.

Now we group the relationship between materialism and dialectics; it consists in this: that in the material world dialectics find their proof, the evolution of the universe, as revealed by Kant, and the development of living forms, as demonstrated by Darwin are dialectic pro-

cesses and prove the correctness of dialectic thinking.

As Engels states it:

"Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution. In this connection Darwin must be named before all others. He dealt the metaphysical conception of nature the heaviest blow by his proof that all organic beings, plants, animals, and man himself, are the products of a process of evolution going on through millions of years."

Engels therefore gives the following definition of the dialectic:

"The dialectic is, as a matter of fact, nothing but the science of the universal laws of motion, and evolution in nature, human society and thought."

The overthrow of the metaphysical conception of nature by Darwin must not be interpreted to mean that all modern scientists are now dialectical thinkers. This is, unfortunately, far from being the case. This is one of the

disadvantages of specialism. The specialist in science devotes himself so wholly to one field that he is isolated largely from science in general and drifts further and further away from those great generalizations which constitute the chief glory of modern science.

The Greeks suffered in the opposite way. They had the general picture of the universe only; not having accumulated the materials for an examination of the details. The modern scientist, on the other hand, is surrounded by such a wealth of detail that he tends to lose sight of the general picture. In more than one conspicuous instance he has been unable to see the wood for the trees.

Prof. Dühring in his criticism of Marx expresses open contempt for the dialectic and all that it involves. So greatly does it provoke him that Engels says: "The mere word 'dialectic' makes Herr Dühring mentally irresponsible."

Marx in discussing the transformation of money into capital said: "Here, as in nature, the correctness of the law of logic as discovered by Hegel, is established—that mere quantitative changes at a certain point take on qualitative differences." Dühring states the case

given by Marx in a weak, confused fashion of his own and then says "how comical."

Engels then takes up the defense of Marx's position by giving instances of the operation of the law. He cites chemistry. In chemistry he shows that mere changes in quantity of the same atoms produce wholly different results in the matter of quality.

Take two atoms of carbon, four atoms of hydrogen and two of oxygen and the result of the combination is acetic acid. Now we combine the same kind of atoms, but in different quantities: three atoms of carbon, six of hydrogen and two of oxygen, and we have a different qualitative result—propionic acid. Again: carbon four atoms, hydrogen eight, oxygen two and we get butyric acid. Again C_5, H_{10}, O_2 —valerianic acid.

All these acids, although produced by mere quantitative changes, are qualitatively different and have different boiling points. Their respective boiling points are: acetic acid, 118 degrees, propionic acid, 140; butyric acid, 162; valerianic, 175.

Engels takes a very interesting illustration of this principle from Napoleon. He says:

"In conclusion, let us call attention to a witness on the change of quantity into quality,

namely Napoleon. He describes the conflicts between the French cavalry, bad riders but disciplined, with the Mamelukes who, as regards single combat, were better horsemen but undisciplined, as follows—"Two Mamelukes were a match for three Frenchmen, one hundred Mamelukes were equal to one hundred Frenchmen, three hundred Frenchmen could beat three hundred Mamelukes and a thousand Frenchmen invariably defeated fifteen hundred Mamelukes.' "

And now what was the Marxian instance of the working of this law in economics which seemed so "comical" to Herr Dühring?

Marx contends in "Capital" that "not every amount of gold or value capable of being transformed into capital is so transformed; rather a certain minimum of gold or of exchange value is presupposed to be in the possession of the owner of gold or goods." Marx then gives an example of two workers working twelve hours a day. Eight hours of the twelve are required to produce the value of their wages. The remaining four are surplus value and constitute profit. If an employer had two men working for him he would only have the same income as each of his workers—the product of eight hours of labor. If, therefore, he lives as well

as his workers there would be no more accumulation of capital in his case than in theirs. In order to accumulate capital he must employ and exploit more than two workers. If he lived twice as well as his workers and employed eight men he would be able to transform half his surplus value into capital. And this transformation of half his income into a different category of quality is due solely to the quantitative increase in the number of his employes. What there is that is "comical" about this was visible only the Berlin professor.

In his reply to Proudhon, Marx had pointed out another well known instance of the working of this law. He there argues that a number of men working together co-operatively would produce greater results than would be possible with the same number of men working in isolation; and that the extra results are due to the principle of combination or co-operation, which grows out of a quantitative increase of the group. And Marx declares: "We can cite a hundred economists who have expressed this simple truth."

He satisfies himself with quoting one—the English economist, Sadler, who says:

"Combined labor gives results which individual labor could never produce. In proportion,

then, as people increase in number, the products of their united industry will greatly exceed the sum of a simple addition calculated on this increase. * * * In mechanical arts, as in the labors of science, a man can actually do more in a day than an isolated individual could do in his whole life. The axiom of the mathematician, that the whole is equal to its parts, is not true as applied to this subject. As to labor, the great pillar of human existence, it may be said that the product of accumulated efforts greatly exceeds all that individual and separate efforts could ever accomplish."

When Marx applies to capitalist society the Hegelian "negation of the negation" Dühring gets another opportunity for the display of his satirical powers. In developing his argument Marx maintained that capitalist property had abolished—negated—individual private ownership as it had existed at the beginning of capitalist development. The collapse of capitalist property—its negation—he argued, would restore individual private property, but not on its former basis, the individual ownership of his tools by the worker, but on a new basis of the social ownership of the means of production.

This idea of social property and individual property existing at the same time seemed very

funny to Dühring, and he says: "Herr Marx consoles himself in the midst of his simultaneously individual and social property and leaves his disciples to solve his profound dialectical puzzle."

Now let us see what was this great mystery, this "profound dialectic puzzle" which Dühring could make no sense of; this nonsense about social property and individual property existing at the same time. Marx had said:

"The total product of the society (a Socialist society) is a social product. A portion of this product serves again as a means of production. It remains social. But another portion is consumed by the members of society. It must therefore be distributed." By distribution, this part of the social product of course becomes private property. But this private property in the things to be consumed is based upon and co-existent with social property in the means by which these things were produced! What could be more perfectly simple? The profound dialectic puzzle had no existence outside Herr Dühring's confused brain.

In his defense of the Marxian use of the "negation of the negation," Engels illustrated the principle in great variety of fields.

"Let us take a grain of barley. Millions of

such grains of barley will be ground, cooked and brewed and then consumed. But let such a grain of barley fall on suitable soil under normal conditions, a complete individual change at once takes place in it under the influence of heat and moisture, it germinates. The grain, as such disappears, is negated; in its place arises the plant, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal course of life of this plant? It grows, blossoms, bears fruit and finally produces other grains of barley, and as soon as these are ripe the stalk dies, and becomes negated in its turn. As the result of this negation of the negation, we have the original grains of barley again, not singly, however, but ten, twenty or thirty fold. Forms of grain change very slowly, and so the grain of barley remains practically the same as a hundred years ago. But let us take a cultivated ornamental plant, like the dahlia or orchid. Let us consider the seed and the plants developed from it by the skill of the gardener, and we have in testimony of this negation of the negation no longer the same seeds, but qualitatively improved seed which produces more beautiful flowers, and every repetition of this process, every new negation of the negation increases the tendency to perfection.

“Similarly this process is gone through by most insects, butterflies, for example. They come out of the egg by a negation of the egg, they go through certain transformations till they reach sex maturity, they copulate and are again negated, since they die as soon as the process of copulation is completed, and the female has laid her innumerable eggs. That the matter is not so plainly obvious in the case of other plants and animals, seeing that they produce seeds, plants and animals not once but oftener, does not affect us in this case. We are now only concerned in showing that the negation of the negation actually does occur in both kingdoms of the organic world.”

Engels then traces its operation in geology and mathematics and history.

In history Engels sees the negation of the negation in the changing forms of land ownership:

“All civilized peoples began with common property in land. Among all peoples which pass beyond a certain primitive stage the common property in land becomes a fetter upon production in the process of agricultural development. It is cast aside, negated, and, after shorter or longer intervening periods, is transformed into private property. But at a higher

stage, through the development still further of agriculture, private property becomes in its turn a bar to production, as is today the case with both large and small land proprietorship. The next step, to negate it in turn, to transform it into social property, necessarily follows. This advance, however, does not signify the restoration of the old primitive common property, but the establishment of a far higher, better developed form of communal proprietorship, which, far from being an impediment to production, rather, for the first time, is bound to put an end to its limitations and to give it the full benefit of modern discoveries in chemistry and mechanical inventions.

The fertile brain of Engels discovers this principle at work also in the growth of philosophy:

“Ancient philosophy was primitive, naturalistic materialism. In the state of thought at that period it was, as such, incapable of clear conceptions of matter. But the necessity of clearness on this point led to the doctrine of a soul which could leave the body, then to the idea of the immortality of the soul, finally, to monotheism. The old materialism was therefore negated by idealism. But in the further development of philosophy idealism became un-

tenable, and is negated by modern materialism. This, the negation of negation, is not the mere re-establishment of the old, but unites, with the surviving foundation the whole thought content of a two thousand years' development of philosophy and science, as well as the history of these two thousand years."

Even this profusion of illustration does not satisfy Engels; he traces it at some length in Rousseau's doctrine of equality.

We will now see how Marx applied this conception to the development and coming collapse of capitalist society, which is based on capitalist property. The first step in the development of capitalist property is the expropriation of the individual worker from the ownership of his individual tools and the product that was his in virtue of that ownership of his tools. This is the first negation. Now Marx shall speak for himself:

"There is no longer the self-employed worker to expropriate, but the capitalist who expropriates many workers. This expropriation fulfills itself through the play of laws immanent in capitalist production itself, through the concentration of capital. One capitalist kills many. Hand in hand with this concentration, or the expropriation of many capitalists by a few,

there develop continually the conscious technical application of science, the deliberate organized exploitation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor which can only be employed collectively, and the economizing of all means of production through their employment as the common means of production of combined social labor.

“With the constantly diminishing numbers of capitalist magnates who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, pressure, slavery, degradation and robbery, but there grows also revolt and the constant progress in union and organization of the working class brought about through the mechanism of the capitalistic process of production. Capitalism becomes an impediment to the methods of production developed with and under it. The concentration of the means of production and the organization of labor reach a point where it comes into collision with its capitalistic covering. It is broken. The hour of capitalistic private property strikes. The expropriators are expropriated.”

Thus the negation is negated. The robbers are robbed of their power to rob. The worker

comes at last into his own. The first book of the history of civilization is closed; a book whose pages are saturated with the blood and tears of the oppressed of the world. Humanity opens a new volume and begins to write the first chapter of human liberty.

IX.

VALUE AND SURPLUS VALUE.

Marxian Socialism is called "scientific" Socialism not only because it adopts scientific methods of investigation, but because it founds itself on the same solid ground of material reality. In biology, Professor Huxley arrived at the "physical basis of life." In sociology Marx claimed the material foundation of society. As Huxley found protoplasm to be foundation of all organic forms, Marx discovered economic processes to be the groundwork of all social orders.

Biologic research regards hunger and love as the two prime forces in organic life. These are the forces that conserve and perpetuate the species respectively. Marx recognized these forces and said that society's methods of satisfying its physical needs will determine the character of its intellectual superstructure.

These needs are met by the production and distribution of wealth, which is the subject matter of political economy. And it was because Marx had the philosophical insight to

recognize economics as the basis of society and therefore the key to historical development, that he became an economist.

The story of this evolution from philosopher to economist and the reasons for it are related by Marx himself in one of the most important, brilliant and all too brief documents in Socialist literature—the celebrated preface to his first important economic work, the “Critique of Political Economy.” There Marx explains how in 1842-43 as editor of the most radical paper in Germany—the “*Rheinische Zeitung*”—he found himself in the embarrassing position of having to write on questions with which he was unfamiliar.

His education and studies up to this point embraced mainly, jurisprudence, philosophy and history. Here, says he, “I had to take part in discussion concerning so-called material interests. The proceedings of the Rhine Diet in connection with forest thefts and the extreme subdivision of landed property; the official controversy about the condition of the Mosel peasants into which Herr von Schaper, at that time president of the Rhine Province, entered with the “*Rheinische Zeitung*”; finally the debates on free trade and protection,

gave me the first impulse to take up the study of economic questions."

While Marx was still editor "a weak quasi-philosophic echo of French Socialism and communism" found its way into the columns of the paper. Marx was a drastic radical, even in those early days, and he says "I declared myself against such botching." The owners of the paper were afraid that by being too radical, Marx would kill the paper and they dismissed him. As Marx narrates it: "When, therefore, the publishers of the "Rheinische Zeitung" conceived the illusion that by a less aggressive policy the paper could be saved from the death sentence pronounced upon it, I was glad to grasp that opportunity to retire to my study room from public life." It is gratifying to note that the paper had a speedy death.

Continuing the story of his intellectual development in the direction of economics, Marx says:

"The first work undertaken for the solution of the questions that troubled me was a critical revision of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Law'; the introduction to that work appeared in the 'Deutsch Franzosische Jahrbucher,' published in Paris in 1844. I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as

forms of state could neither be understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions of life, which are summed up by Hegel after the fashion of the English and French of the nineteenth century under the name 'civic society'; the anatomy of the civic society is to be sought in political economy."

Thus did Marx arrive at that theory known by the various names of "Historical Materialism," "Economic Determinism," etc., which will always constitute his chief claim to immortality. Marx wrote "Capital" to lay bare the bony skeleton—"the anatomy" of bourgeois society, which, according to his epoch making theory, was "to be sought in political economy."

In political economy Marx begins with the commodity. The opening sentence of "Capital" reads: "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities." A commodity is an article manufactured for the purpose of being exchanged. The exchange is made in capitalist society through the medium of money. We therefore say: it is made for sale.

This is one of the main features which distinguishes capitalist society from previous social forms. It produces for the market; its purpose of production is primarily sale, and only secondarily for use. The producing capitalist does not care whether he is making family bibles or snuff so long as he finds a market and makes a profit.

Things that are to be sold or exchanged must have value; that is the most important thing about them, and the question as to what that value consists of and how it is created and how it can be measured, is the central problem of political economy.

Although Marx is the acknowledged champion and representative of the labor theory of value he was not the first to broach it. For more than a hundred years it was foreshadowed with greater or less confusion by his predecessors from Sir William Petty to David Ricardo in England, and from Boisguillebert to Sismondi in France.

Adam Smith, the famous author of "The Wealth of Nations," believed in the theory but only as it might apply under certain ideal conditions which might possibly have existed in some simpler phase of society in the past. But it seemed to Smith to break down in a more

complex social stage where there was a tangled network of the social relations of capitalist, worker, landlord, etc.

David Ricardo, on the other hand, made a considerable advance over Smith. The increasing complexities of capitalism did not shake Ricardo's belief and Marx says of him: "Ricardo gave to classical political economy its final shape and formulated and elaborated with the greatest clearness the law of the determination of exchange value by labor time."

Ricardo, however, was unable to see that each historic society has its own economic laws and so he imagines capitalist production to have prevailed in primitive society. This form of error is common to all economists who have not the evolutionary conception of social progress and it constantly reappears in all its crudeness in the pseudo-economic writings of Henry George and his befuddled disciples. The Georgian economist is never so thoroughly at home as when he is illustrating modern economy by a painted savage catching fish with his naked hand.

From the utopian and unhistoric setting of Ricardo, Marx removed the labor theory of value and set it at the center of Socialist political economy. Of course, Marx did a great deal

more than transplant the theory. He worked it out, solved its apparent contradictions, and furnished its proof.

As Ricardo was the chief advocate of the theory in his day, the main objections to it were leveled at him. These objections have been urged from that time down to date. In the crude and undeveloped form in which Ricardo held the theory many of those objections could not be met. The answer came with Marx.

One of the most striking of these objections is thus stated by Marx: "If exchange value is nothing but mere labor-time contained in commodities, how can commodities which contain no labor possess exchange value?"

In a debate against Mr. John Z. White in Cincinnati, in which I was defending the Marxian theory of value and disputing his contention that land possessed economic value although obviously not produced by labor, Mr. White suddenly asked what he evidently considered an unanswerable question—"If a lump of gold fell out of the sky, as it would contain no human labor would it therefore be without value?"

This hypothetical lump of gold was borrowed by Mr. White from the Austrian Econ-

omist Böhm-Bawerk, who is the acknowledged chief of modern Marx critics, and by whom it was hurled at the head of the unfortunate Marx who was supposed to be all unprepared for a rain of high grade ore.

This childish objection on the part of the distinguished Austrian only shows, however, the general all-round incapacity of Marx critics to understand what Marx taught.

Marx never declared the value of commodity to be determined by the actual amount of labor expended in its production. What he did teach was that the amount of labor-time socially necessary for the re-production of a commodity—i. e., its production at that given time—determined its value.

If a lazy workman should spend ten hours in the production of a commodity which on the average only required five hours' labor, the commodity would not have double value because he consumed double time. On the contrary he would have worked five hours for no purpose and for which his commodity or product would have no added value because the extra five hours would not be "necessary" labor.

We will let Marx speak for himself:

"In saying that the value of a commodity is

determined by the quantity of labor worked up or crystallized in it, we mean the quantity of labor necessary for its production in a given state of society, under certain social average conditions of production, with a given social average intensity, and average skill of the labor employed. When in England the power loom came to compete with the hand loom, only one-half the former time of labor was wanted to convert a given amount of yarn into a yard of cotton or cloth. The poor hand loom weaver now worked seventeen or eighteen hours daily, instead of the nine or ten hours he had worked before. Still the product of twenty hours of his labor represented now only ten social hours of labor, or ten hours of labor socially necessary for the conversion of a certain amount of yarn into textile stuffs. His product of twenty hours had, therefore, no more value than his former product of ten hours."

The value of Böhm-Bawerk's gold-charged meteoric stone would be determined by the amount of average social labor necessary to the production of another one like it.

Here we see how the "Law of Value" officiated as pall-bearer at the funeral of the small capitalist. When the large industrial capitalist increased the efficiency of his plant

by introducing labor saving machinery he not only produced more cheaply himself, but he reduced the value of the small producer's commodity to just the same extent. This meant bankruptcy for the "little fellow," because in order to sell he must accept a price based on the small amount of labor consumed by the "big fellow," while he himself, not having up-to-date machinery, had to expend much more for labor.

This is precisely where Proudhon came to the rescue of the distressed petty bourgeois, whose intellectual champion he really was. Proudhon proposed that value, instead of being left to the play of the economic forces which now determine it, should be arbitrarily fixed from the outside. This is his famous project for the "Constitution of Value." Value should be "constituted," it should be fixed by the state. Then when a small capitalist manufactured a coat by consuming four hours' labor (the labor of his small handful of men and apprentices) and the big producer, by use of a better plant, produced a similar coat with half the labor, instead of the "little fellow" losing half the value of his product, the value being "constituted" his loss would be covered by the guarantee of the state! A wonderful proposal,

truly, and put forward by that great revolutionary thinker, the "Father of Anarchism," Proudhon.

As to how land comes to have value when it contains no labor, the truth of the matter is that land has no "value." This was even understood by Henry George, though it is Greek to most of his followers. The ownership of land simply entitles the owner to a share of the general plunder which is taken from labor in the process of production.

We now approach a difficulty which goes to the heart of this whole problem, a difficulty behind which the whole secret of the exploitation of labor lies hidden.

According to the pre-Marxian economists the value of a product of labor—a commodity—is equal to the value of the labor consumed in its production. Therefore by the same rule it was quite clear that the "value of labor" must be equal to the value of the commodity which that labor had produced.

This circle of reasoning landed bourgeois economy in a puzzling dilemma from which there seemed to be no possible escape. Ricardo, in spite of the cleverness which led Lord Brougham to say of him: "Mr. Ricardo seemed as if he had dropped from another planet," was

unable to see a way out. And Adam Smith boldly asserted: "The natural wages of labor is the product of labor."

The English Socialists took Ricardo at his word. They said: if your theory is true why is it not practiced? If a product requiring twelve hours of labor is equal in value to the labor used, and the twelve hours of labor are equal in value to the product which those hours of labor produced, why does not the laborer get the whole of the product? And if it be contended that this is already happening, that the laborer already receives in his wages all the value his labor creates, and his labor is the sole source of value, how does the capitalist manage to get rich—where do profits come from?

Before this question bourgeois economy is completely baffled.

Numerous capitalist apologists have endeavored to prove that profit does not come from labor at all; that it has some independent source. Of all the fatuous attempts in this direction the one that is most clearly entitled to the cap and bells is that of Henry George, who maintained that the income of the capitalist was derived, not from labor, but from the reproductive and value-creating powers of na-

ture—the swarming of bees, the breeding powers of rabbits and cattle, and the aging of wine!

Herbert Spencer in his “Essay on the Social Organism” ventures another explanation. Spencer is busy looking for ingenious analogies between the body physical and the body politic, when he stumbles across this one which seems to explain and at the same time, of course, justify profit:

“That any organ in a living being may grow by exercise, there needs a due supply of blood. All action implies waste; blood brings the materials for repair; and before there can be growth, the quantity of blood supplied must be more than is requisite for repair. In a society it is the same. If to some district which elaborates for the community particular commodities—say the woolens of Yorkshire—there comes an augmented demand, a certain expenditure and wear and tear of the manufacturing organization are incurred; and if in payment for the extra quantity of woolens sent away, there comes back only such quantity of commodities as replaces the expenditure, and makes good the waste of life and machinery, there can clearly be no growth. That there may be growth, the commodities obtained in return

must be more than sufficient for these ends; and just in proportion as the surplus is great will the growth be rapid. Whence it is manifest that what in commercial affairs we call profit, answers to the excess of nutrition over waste in a living body."

Whence it is also manifest that strange things may overtake philosophers who wander into unfamiliar fields and propound opinions on questions about which they are wholly devoid of information. According to this ingenious idea the volume of world production could never increase since the woolen districts of Yorkshire could only grow at the expense of a corresponding loss to some other districts which had the misfortune to trade with them.

Capitalists would grow rich at the expense of each other, what one gained the other must lose. As well expect a dozen gamblers in a room with a hundred dollars each, to increase the total sum by winning from each other. We are reminded by Blatchford's story of the mariners wrecked on a desert island, who, in their dire extremity, "made a somewhat precarious living by taking in one another's washing."

Before we present the Marxian solution of the origin of profits we will pause for a moment to ascertain what price is and how it is

related to value, as this will help us to understand what follows.

In "Wage Labor and Capital" Marx writes thus:

"By what means is the price of a commodity determined?

"By means of competition between buyers and sellers, and the relation between supply and demand—offer and desire. And this competition by which the price of an article is fixed is threefold.

"The same commodity is offered in the market by various sellers. Whoever offers the greatest advantage to purchasers is certain to drive the other sellers off the field and secure for himself the greatest sale. The sellers, therefore, fight for the sale and the market among themselves. Every one of them wants to sell, and does his best to sell as much, and if possible to become the only seller. Therefore, each outbids the other in cheapness, and a competition takes place among the sellers which lowers the price of goods they offer.

"But a competition also goes on among the purchasers, which on their side raises the price of the goods offered.

"Finally there arises a competition between buyers and sellers; the one set want to buy

as cheap as possible, the other to sell as dear as possible. The result of this competition between buyers and sellers will depend upon the relations of the two previous aspects of the competition; that is upon whether that of the buyers or that of the sellers is the keener. Business thus leads two opposing armies into the field, and each of them again presents the aspect of a battle in its own ranks between its own soldiers. That army whose troops are least mauled by one another carries off the victory over the opposing host."

It must be remembered, however, that while price fluctuates it is always in the neighborhood of value. Price is the monetary expression of value. The pendulum of a clock swings from side to side, but it is always seeking the middle. If it were not for the spring in the clock, the pendulum would stop, pointing to the center of the earth which is its center of gravity.

In the same way price oscillates about value, driven now above and now below by supply and demand—by competition among buyers or sellers.

"We have just seen," says Marx, "how the fluctuations of supply and demand always reduce the price of a commodity to its cost of

production. It is true that the precise price of a commodity is always either above or below its cost of production; but the rise and fall reciprocally balance each other, so within a certain period, if the ebb and flow of the business are reckoned up together, commodities are exchanged with one another in accordance with their cost of production; and thus their cost of production determines their price."

Now we return to the main problem which baffled the penetration of Smith and Ricardo and yielded only to the genius of Marx.

Marx discovered that when the capitalist hired a laborer to work for a twelve-hour day, he did not purchase twelve hours of labor. If he had, and the price he paid in wages represented the value of twelve hours of labor, said value being equal to the product of the twelve hours, there would clearly be nothing left in the shape of profit after the laborer had been paid.

Marx discovered that what the capitalist bought was not the day of labor, but the laborer's labor power—his energy, his power to work, in short his brain and sinew, his bone and blood. And having bought this "power to labor" he consumed it by using it in his factory

for as many hours as constituted the customary working day.

How shall we reckon the value of this labor power which the laborer sells and the capitalist buys? Just as we compute the value of any other commodity—for it is the peculiarity of bourgeois society that it converts flesh and blood, bone, brain and tissue into a commodity. The value of the commodity labor power is determined, not by what it produces when consumed in the factory, but by what it cost the laborer to produce the labor power.

As this energy is produced and maintained by eating, drinking, sleeping, etc., the cost of its production will be the price of the food, clothing, shelter, etc., necessary to keep the laborer in working order.

Now we come to the source of all profit. It is to be found in the difference between the cost of the production of labor power and the value of the commodities which that labor power produces when it is expended in production in the workshop.

A shoe worker is hired for ten hours. His wages are two dollars. During the first five hours, by noon let us say, he makes one pair of shoes. This pair of shoes is worth three dollars. Their cost to the capitalist is as follows:

Wages, \$2, wear and tear of machinery 20 cents, raw material, leather, nails, etc., 80 cents; total \$3. So far there is no profit for the capitalist and if our laborer, under these circumstances, stopped work at noon, he would fail to illustrate the capitalist mode of production.

But he goes on in the afternoon and makes another pair of shoes, value \$3. The cost to the capitalist of this second pair of shoes is raw material 80 cents, depreciation of machinery 20 cents, total \$1, nothing to pay for labor, profit for the day \$2. It is from this "unpaid-labor" that capitalists derive their profits. The laborer remains poor and the capitalist waxes rich, because the laborer works part of the day for himself—to reproduce his wages—and part of the day to create value for which the capitalist gives him no reward. As capital is accumulated out of profits, capital itself is "unpaid labor."

The labor which the laborer performs early in the day to cover his own wages Marx calls "necessary labor," necessary to reproduce wages. The labor performed afterwards, he calls "surplus labor," labor over and above what the capitalist pays for.

The "necessary labor" produces "necessary product"; the surplus labor produces surplus

product. The "necessary product" realizes itself in "necessary value"; the "surplus product" manifests itself in "surplus value."

And it is from "surplus value," created without recompense that the wealth of the wealthy has its origin; and it is here that Marx lays bare that process of exploitation which is the prolific fountain from which there springs the misery and degradation of the toilers of the world.

X.

THE FALLACIES OF PROUDHON.

It was a countryman of Proudhon's, August Comte, who illumined the intellectual history of the human race by dividing it into three periods—the theological, the metaphysical and the positive or scientific. These periods are the mental infancy, youth and manhood of the race, and we all live in one or another of them. The minds of most men are an incongruous mixture of two or even all three.

Peter Kropotkin reached the third stage—the positive—in his views on biology but he never emerged from the second in his political and social theories. Proudhon never passed the second stage in anything.

Marx and Proudhon were at one time close friends. Marx relates how in 1844 he and Proudhon sat up, often all night, discussing questions of philosophy and political economy. Four years before, in 1840, Proudhon had written his book, "What Is Property?" Marx saw from the brilliance and force of Proudhon's

style in this work that he was destined to wield an immense influence in the Socialist movement of France.

For this reason Marx endeavored to influence his opinions. "I infected him," says Marx, "with Hegelianism, to his great prejudice, since not knowing German, he could not study the matter thoroughly."

Two years after these all night discussions, in 1846, Proudhon produced his second important work, "The Philosophy of Misery," and Marx says, "Proudhon informed me of it in a long and detailed letter, in which among other things he said: 'I await the blow of your critical rod.' And very soon this fell upon him in such a way as to forever shatter our friendship."

The "critical rod" fell in Marx's "Misery of Philosophy." Marx saw by Proudhon's second book that his case was hopeless and that he would never escape the narrow grooves of bourgeois thought in which he was ever becoming more and more enmeshed.

Marx's preface is only two paragraphs and the longer of them is as follows: "M. Proudhon has the misfortune of being singularly misunderstood in Europe. In France he has the right to be a bad economist, because he passes for a

good German philosopher. In Germany he has the right to be a bad philosopher because he passes for one of the greatest of French economists. We, both as German and economist, wish to protest against this double error."

Two years after Marx wrote this preface—in 1849—Proudhon gave a very striking proof of his incompetence in German philosophy. In an article in his own paper, "The Voice of the People," in November of that year, he develops his theory of the state.

He regarded that article of such importance that he published it as the preface to the third edition of his "Confessions of a Revolutionist," written in the same year.

Proudhon announces: "What Kant did some sixty years ago for religion, what he did earlier for certainty or certainties; what others before him had attempted to do for happiness or supreme good, the 'Voice of the People' proposes to do for the government."

What was it then that Kant did for religion—according to Proudhon? "If there does exist a Being superior to Humanity, there must also exist a system of the relations between this being and Humanity. What, then, is this system? The search for the best religion is the second step that the human mind takes in rea-

son and in faith. Kant gave up these insoluble questions. He no longer asked himself what is God, and which is the best religion, he set about explaining the origin and development of the idea of God; he undertook to work out the biography of this idea."

And this is what Kant discovered in that search—according to Proudhon:

"What we seek, what we see, in God, as Malebranche said * * * is our own ideal, the pure essence of Humanity * * * The human soul does not become conscious of its Ego through premeditated contemplation, as the psychologists put it; the soul perceives something outside itself, as if it were a different Being face to face with itself, and it is this inverted image which it calls God. Thus morality, justice, order, law, are no longer things revealed from above, imposed upon our free will by a so-called Creator, unknown and ununderstandable; they are things that are proper and essential to us as our faculties and our organs, as our flesh and our blood. In two words religion and society are synonymous terms, man is as sacred to himself as if he were God."

And so Kant is represented as having reached the conclusion that God is simply an "inverted image" of man himself; a pigment of

the human brain. Now the merest novice in German philosophy knows that Kant never did anything of the kind.

Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason," denies the possibility of our knowing anything at all about God. He maintains that the human mind is not equipped with any faculty or faculties that enable it to penetrate beyond the phenomena to the noumenon.

True, in his "Critique of Practical Reason" he brings God back again in the name of Practical Morality. But never did Kant maintain that God was an "inverted image" of man. This whole theory which Proudhon attributes to Kant belongs to Ludwig Feuerbach. No wonder that the Germans considered Proudhon a bad German philosopher.

Quite as interesting as his derivation of Feuerbach's theory from Kant is the use he makes of it when derived. He applies the same anthropomorphic reasoning to the state.

"What humanity seeks in religion and calls God, is itself." "What the citizen seeks in government and calls king, emperor, or president, is again himself, is liberty." "Outside humanity there is no God; the theological concept has no meaning—outside liberty no government, the political concept has no value."

Just as God, whom nobody has seen or felt is a figment of the religious brain, so the state with its laws, its soldiers and police, is a mirage of the political imagination!

What an epoch-making discovery! What a monumental warning to all those thinkers who reason by analogy.

Fifty years ago the Socialists foresaw the inevitable collapse of competition. Not so Proudhon. He believed, like all the other utopians, that society would have to bend to "human nature." And human nature was, of course, as Proudhon saw it in the haggling of the petty trader.

He stoutly maintained that abolition of competition could never be accomplished, because, said he, it involves "a transformation of our nature that is without historical precedent."

To this Marx replied: "M. Proudhon does not know that the whole of history is but a continual transformation of human nature."

Human nature was not the only metaphysical abstraction that held Proudhon's mind in bondage. There was one on which he claimed to have founded his whole position. This was that particular idol of the petty bourgeois, eternal justice.

He doles out to his readers the following grandiloquent jargon about justice :

“Justice is a faculty of the soul, the foremost of all, that which constitutes a social being.

‘Justice is the inviolable yardstick of all human actions.

“Justice is the central star which governs societies, the pole about which the political world revolves, the principle and the rule of all transactions. Nothing is done among men that is not done in the name of right ; nothing without invoking justice.

“All the most rational teachings of human wisdom about justice are summed up in this famous adage: ‘Do unto others as you would have done unto you; do not to others as you would not have done to you.’ ”

All this empty claptrap about justice was beginning to lose force even fifty years ago when Proudhon wrote it and now it has the hollow sound of third reader oratory.

Eternal justice! Eternal nonsense. Justice is a creature of time and place. Justice is determined by class interests. Justice from one point of view is injustice from another. In the days of Plato chattel slavery was just. In the

days of Burke and Chatham it had become unjust.

Chattel slavery was just and unjust at one and the same time in two different parts of this country—just in the south, unjust in the north.

It is true that "nothing is done among men that is not done in the name of right." The feudal nobility fought the bourgeoisie in the French revolution in the name of right, and the bourgeoisie fought just as fiercely in the name of justice; and the working class, without knowing what it was all about, took up the cry of right and rushed in and was crucified between the two thieves.

The employer reduces wages in the name of right and the employe invokes justice and goes on strike. Justice is always invoked on both sides of every question.

The belligerent French nobility had a battle cry in the middle ages—"Dieu et Mon Droit," which was supposed to be a calling upon "God and the right." But when properly translated "the right" here means "the right hand." And the right hand was the sword hand. The feudal warrior put no trust in abstractions, but reposed his faith in the power of his sword.

It was a modern general who said: "Trust in God and keep your powder dry."

One can understand that a regiment with dry powder would have a chance even though for a time the thought of God, as would be natural enough under the circumstances, should be out of its mind. But what would befall a profoundly religious company which entered the fray with wet powder?

When the hypocritical British went to war with the Boers they invoked justice; their preachers rose in their pulpits and devoutly requested the Deity to enable the British arms to penetrate the bodies of the offending Boers; and the citizens of the Transvaal republic and the Orange Free State, also, with greater show of reason, invoked justice, and the pastors of that exceedingly pious people called upon the same Deity to enable their sharpshooters to let daylight through every British soldier.

The idea of the golden rule is about as old as the Rocky mountains, but it has never had any force since the dawn of "civilization," and never can have so long as private property in the means of life persists. Like justice, it is a meaningless abstraction.

To take one illustration that comes close home: Here is the capitalist who says, "I have

accumulated property and now my style of living and that of my family depends on my ownership of that property. Now, you Socialists, put yourself in my place, and would you like me, if I were in your place, to come along and take away your property?" Of course not.

Then there is the other side. The golden rule workingman says to the golden rule capitalist: "I work long hours and produce much wealth, and when I have done so you take the greater part; if you were in my place would you like me, if I were in your place, to come and appropriate the greater part of the wealth which you had by your labor created?" Certainly not.

The Socialist philosophy has recognized long ago that this problem will never be solved by any application of the golden rule, but only by a class war.

The question of the difference in value between different kinds of labor came up in the controversy and it furnishes an excellent illustration of the difference in the types of mind of Marx and Proudhon.

Marx maintained that there were two kinds of labor—simple labor and complex labor—and that as an axiom in political economy the complex labor had the higher value. The complex laborer spent some years as an apprentice,

learning how to perform skilled labor, and those years had to be reckoned in the cost of the production of his particular labor power. When he worked as a journeyman he expended not only his direct labor power, but he incorporated with it the labor power of previous years, thus making it complex.

The simple laborer began work with a shovel without previous training and expended a labor power that did not involve the expense of an apprenticeship.

Proudhon refused to accept this doctrine and considered it reactionary. He maintained that all labor had the same value and should receive the same reward.

Marx, taking, as he always did, the evolutionary view, allowed that this differentiation in the valuation of labor was waning even in bourgeois society, and the real difference in the mental powers of the two disputants appears in their accounting for the origin of the idea of the equality in value of all labor.

Proudhon, after his fashion, believed the idea to be simply a deduction from the eternal principles of absolute justice. Marx, on the contrary, true to his whole philosophy, held that the notion had its origin in economic processes. He pointed out that the highly com-

plex machine was rapidly displacing the mechanic's skill and reducing him to the level of simple laborer, and that out of this "fact" grew the "idea" of their equality; it did not descend, as Proudhon thought, from the cloudland of eternal justice, but was created by modern industry.

Proudhon believed that the social question consisted in certain economic contradictions and its solution must be found in a reconciliation of those contradictions. These economic categories had two sides—a good side and a bad side. The good side was expounded by the economists; the bad side was criticised and condemned by the Socialists. The good side must be conserved and the bad side abolished.

Here, for example, is the good side of competition:

"Competition is as essential to labor as division. * * * It is necessary to the advent of equality."

Now the bad side:

"This principle is the negation of itself. Its most certain effect is to ruin those whom it draws into its train."

Proudhon reflects:

"The inconveniences which follow in its train, as well as the good which it procures,

* * * flow logically, the one and the other, from the principle."

And the problem is:

"To find the principle of reconciliation, which must be derived from a law superior to liberty itself."

And: "It cannot therefore be here a question of destroying competition, a thing as impossible as to destroy liberty itself; it is a question of finding the equilibrium."

And so, according to Proudhon, the problem is to find the reconciliation. The two sides must be reconciled and the two classes, laborer and capitalist, must be reconciled. In 1848, two years after he had developed this theory of contradictions, he ran as a candidate for office at Doubs, and the following was printed on his election circular:

"The social question is there; you cannot escape from it. To solve it we must have men who combine extreme radicalism of mind with extreme conservatism of mind. Workers, hold out your hands to your employers; and you, employers, do not deliberately repulse the advances of those who were your wage earners."

The man who was to "combine extreme radicalism of mind with extreme conservatism of

mind," and reconcile the good and bad sides of bourgeois civilization and bring together in friendly relations the two classes, was none other than the great revolutionary philosopher, proclaimed by Kropotkin to be the father of anarchism, P. J. Proudhon!

Proudhon maintains that society begins by supplying its simplest wants fully and then "attacks the production of objects which cost more labor time and which correspond to wants of a higher order."

To which Marx replied: "Things go quite otherwise than as M. Proudhon thinks. * * * To say now that, because all the wants of all the workers were satisfied, men could give themselves up to the creation of products of a superior order, more complicated industries, would be to make abstraction of the antagonism of classes, and to overthrow the whole development of history. It is as if one should say that because under the Roman emperors, murenas were nourished in artificial fish ponds, there was food in abundance for all the population of Rome. But, on the contrary, the Roman people wanted the necessary means to buy bread, while the Roman aristocrats had no lack of slaves with which to feed their fishes."

Another of Proudhon's pet theories is that

those commodities which are produced in the smallest amount of time possess the greatest amount of utility and are, therefore, in the greatest demand.

This economic absurdity Marx repudiates at some length. "Cotton, potatoes and spirits are the objects of commonest use. Potatoes have engendered scrofula; cotton has largely driven linen and wool out of the market, although wool and linen are in many cases of much greater utility, if only from considerations of hygiene; spirits, again have largely replaced beer and wine, although spirits used as food, are generally recognized to be poison. For a whole century governments vainly struggled against European opinion; economics prevailed, they dictated orders to consumption."

These illustrations advanced by Marx could easily be increased ad infinitum. A few years ago, the vinegrowers of the south of France almost plunged that country in revolution because the wine trust was using chemicals in place of grapes in the production of wine, and the vineyards were falling into ruin as a consequence. It was never contended by anybody that the chemical wine had a greater utility than the grape wine. But it was cheaper and so it conquered the market.

A few weeks ago in the south I heard a com-

mercial traveler who represented a firm of jelly makers complain that the jelly business, which used to flourish, was now about dead. He gave adulteration as the reason. The jelly makers who adulterated most could sell cheapest and got the whole market, and then the public discovered that jelly—as made—was indigestible, and they ceased to buy it at all.

“Why, then,” asks Marx, “are cotton, potatoes and spirits the pivots of bourgeois society? Because the least amount of labor is necessary for their production, and they are in consequence at the lowest price. Why does the minimum of price decide the maximum of consumption? Can it by any chance be because of the absolute utility of these objects (as Proudhon maintains) of their intrinsic utility, of their utility in so far as they correspond in the most useful manner to the needs of the worker, as man, and not of the man as worker? No, it is because, in a society based on poverty, the poorest products have the fatal prerogative of serving the use of the greatest number.

“To say now that because the least costly things are the most generally used, therefore they must be of the greatest utility, is to say that the extensive use of spirits because of their low cost of production is the most conclusive

proof of their utility; it is to tell the proletariat that the potato is the most salutary meat; it is to accept the existing state of things; it is, in fine, to make, with M. Proudhon, the apology for a society without comprehending it.

"In a future society," Marx concludes, "where the antagonism of classes will have ceased, where there will no longer be classes, use will no longer be determined by the minimum time of production; but the time of social production which will be devoted to the various objects will be determined by the degree of social utility."

We shall have to deal briefly with Proudhon's proposal to reconstruct society on a basis of contract. This idea of the freedom of contract was very dear to the bourgeois heart and was at the very center of the Manchester school of politics.

They answered the worker's complaints by telling him that he was free to make any contract he chose, and if he did not wish to work for one employer he was not compelled; he was no slave, but a free contractor.

Proudhon's contract was to take the place of all law, as it would be impossible on a national scale it was to divide society into small contracting groups. There would be no penal in-

stitutions. Any refractory member who failed to keep his contracts could, as Kropotkin suggests, go and spend the rest of his days among savages—though most men would probably prefer a term in jail as a much lighter sentence.

It is of course obvious that these small groups would be much harder to change than a large, centralized state. The whole proposal, at bottom, is to substitute a federation of small states for one big state.

Proudhon's great doctrine and panacea, "The constitution of value," shows how thoroughly his philosophy revolves around the desires of the small bourgeoisie. The small capitalist was very desirous that the determination of value by labor time should be made permanent and placed beyond the reach of the fluctuations of the market. He saw the big industrial capitalist with his improved plant producing the same commodities as himself in half the labor time as his handful of workers and apprentices required, and this reduced his commodities to a value only equal to one-half the time his workers had put into them.

This must be changed, and Proudhon proposed to do so by "constituting value." A commodity should exchange at the actual cost of its production at the time it was, no matter

how much the cost of production might have been lowered between the manufacture and the sale. Bourgeois civilization was to be preserved by taking out the principal wheel of its mechanism.

Although Proudhon was opposed to the state to the point of denying its existence, he is ready to call upon it when value is to be constituted and small capitalists are to have their profits guaranteed against the encroachments of larger ones :


“Let us suppose that the provisional government or the constituent assembly * * * had seriously wished to help along business, encourage commerce, industry, agriculture, stop the depreciation of property, assure work to the workers—it could have been done by guaranteeing, e. g., to the first 10,000 contractors, factory owners, manufacturers, merchants, etc., in the whole republic, an interest of 5 per cent. on the capital, say, on the average, 100,000 francs, that each of them had embarked in his competitive business.”

The fundamental point of difference between Marx and Proudhon, however is as to the source of ideas, the question as to where we must look for an explanation of progress and for indications of the course of future development.

Proudhon, utopian to the core, looks to metaphysical abstractions such as "human nature," "eternal justice," etc.

Marx holds that moral notions should be kept clear of economics. The value of a notion of justice depends wholly upon whether or not it is founded on economic reality. The moral condemnation of an economic form can have no value unless it is based upon the fact that the economic form in question is already being superseded in the development of industry.

The hope of Socialism does not lie with the Socialist lecturer or editor who proclaims its superior justice. It will triumph because back of the lecturer and the newspaper stands the inexorable economic evolutionary process which grinds capitalism to powder and moves majestically forward to the dawning of a new day.





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